

The Personalist

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GRACE AND FREEWILL

BY BENEDETTO CROCE

I contemplate myself, my past life, the work which I have done. What is there of this work and of this life which belongs to me? What can I, with full consciousness, call myself? If a thought arising in me has seemed to myself and to others to be an attainment of truth, it came into my mind as it were by illumination. Now, when I understand its character better, and see what belongs to it, and retrace its genesis, I find that my thought is the logical and necessary outcome of previous thought, by other minds, in former ages, of discussions, in which those who opposed it have participated in forming it just as effectively as those who held it, and it appears to me as though it must have arisen of itself, and that I and my mind have been no more than its theatre, the place of its manifestation. If I recall an action which has given me satisfaction, I feel it would be fatuous to attribute its merit to myself, for when I performed it a force had flared up within me which bore me along spontaneously, or overthrew all opposition; and had it happened in this case (as it has happened in other cases), that this directing and sustaining force had failed me, I should not have known how to generate it. So then, the action was done in me, it was not I who did it; thus only could it be done, because Reality, or Spirit, as I name it, had need of it in the logic of its own development. If I am praised for it, I cannot enjoy the praise. I feel perplexed and confounded. The gift offered me is equivocal, and I feel that in accepting it I should be taking something to which I had no right. Then again men blame me for my errors and wrongdoing, and I myself recognize that I make assertions which are false and do actions which are bad. Yet when I look into the

origin and real character of my false words and wrong actions I find them not wholly inexcusable, when I take into account the actual conditions in which I was placed. (The conditions themselves could be no excuse, because conditions do not mechanically determine the errors and faults.) Also I have to recognize that had those errors not been committed, then the higher truth could never have come to birth, the truth nourished on the experience of errors; and had the wrong not been done then my better action, that which through regret and remorse has been corrected and invigorated, would have been unperformed. So, then, those very errors and that wrong action were necessary and belong, not to me, but to the author of good and evil, to the Spirit, which by this means develops and grows, to the Providence, which so disposes and follows a logic of its own, a logic of opposites which we call dialectic. At certain moments Grace departed from me; at other moments Providence willed that Grace should fail me, that I should err and sin, in order to prepare the ground and conditions for its new working.

And it is not freewill and responsibility alone which are dissolved by necessity, dialectic, grace and providence. The very concept of the individual as entity and reality vanishes, and its place is taken by the quite different concept of the individuality of work done, an individuality the quality of which is impossible to identify with that of the other, an individuality which is, in its very definition, a universality, concrete not abstract, a real effective universality. And it may lead us even to smile at the thought of attributing immortality in another life to an individual soul which we cannot even endow with reality and existence in this life. For in this life we find only individualized thoughts and deeds, never individuals, only the universal individualizing and de-individualizing as it passes to new individualizations, never the individuals and the universal as two realities confronting one another.

So it is, and yet it is not so, nor does it even appear so. For as soon as I cease to contemplate myself as an outside object, as soon as I re-enter my own being and immerse myself in my

active and practical life, these dissolved and nullified things return with all their old force and rise up as imposing as ever. Once more I am an individual, endowed with freewill, responsible, to be judged by my actions according as they are worthy or unworthy. Attached to my individuality, I cannot feel life, as I live it, as other than immortal. The feeling of mortality which would obstruct and weaken life, I chase from me, keeping the prospect of unlimited continuance, the hope of living which never leaves me, for even my last breath is an act of life and not of death. And all this is purely rational and necessary, for without it, neither the life we call physiological, nor the higher spiritual life, neither practical nor theoretical activity, neither useful nor moral action, would be possible. The justification which I found for my errors and wrong deeds in self-contemplation and meditation are no longer a justification, for now those same errors offend me when I remember them, those actions wound me in the soul. I would do anything not to have uttered the words or done the deeds and were it possible I would blot them out of reality. Since this is impossible, I torture myself, finding only momentary relief in driving them out of mind, entertaining other thoughts, engaging in other actions. No other remedy is there for me but the medicine of ulterior and better inspired action whereby I may correct the ill-said with the better-said, the wrong deed with the nobler deed. I no longer think that what I have thought truly and done well is no part of myself. I bind closely to me as my own these thoughts and deeds; they give me complacency in my memory and confidence in my future action, for my present now appears as the worthy outcome of my past. Should anyone seek to wrest from me the merit, I defend myself, repel the injustice, *Sumo superbiam*.

This twofold change of the self seems at first a contradiction, a flagrant, even a terrible contradiction. Yet to calm reflection it is no other than that alternate working of thought and action, of theory and practice, of the two categories, mind and reality, which exist only for one another, which in their distinction and opposition are resolved into that sole conceivable unity which

is eternal unification. In contemplation and meditation what else are we engaged in but the search for truth, what else are we doing but *thinking history*, our own history and that of others, the history of the human race, of the whole world? And in acting we are creating the history we are thinking. Truth exists only in thought. Action is not truth and does not affirm truth; for whatever appears in action to be truth is always and only the conditions and instruments of action, what gives it concreteness. In this way we may see the absurdity of the attempts to find a foundation in the practical reason for truths which are unknowable by the theoretical reason. These supposed truths are no doubt also unknowable for the practical reason, but this is because they are not truths. Who would give the name of truth to the fantasies which lovers weave around their loved ones and loved ones around their lovers? Yet though fantasies for us, they are the fullest reality for them, a reality which we know withstands all criticism, failing only with love, with which indeed it is one. No less false, no less pernicious is it to transport the theoretical attitude into the practical. This is what we do when, dealing with action, and it is no longer the theoretical judgment or judgment of reality, but the so-called practical judgment or judgment of value (which already is action) which is in question, we take refuge and find a way of escape by citing the Grace which is lacking and the Providence which wills not. In action the individual must act as if he were grace and providence to himself, must compel both, or, to adopt a less paradoxical formula, he must render himself worthy of both by his own efforts and acts.

I have sought to throw light on the double aspect of theory and practice in the spiritual life, not in order to put another face on this conclusion, which ought to be an irenicon to all who understand, but in order to throw down the challenge: Whether this age-long controversy of the theologians regarding Grace and Freewill may not be expounded in a similar and clearer way than that which has been followed hitherto by regarding it as fundamentally a clash and interchange between the two view-

points, the *theoretical and historical* and the *practical and moral*. We shall then say that in *thinking* history we are always placing ourselves at the viewpoint of Grace and Providence and justification by faith, and in *making* history, that is in actualizing the practical life, we are placing ourselves at the viewpoint of Free-will and responsibility and justification by works. It is not a dualism as we have already shown. It is illustrated, moreover, throughout the history of the controversy, in the contrast between *mysticism* and *activism*, between *religion* and *observance*, between the *Christian* and the *Catholic* or *Jesuit* rules of life, and between all such approximate or contingent dissociations. It is also illustrated in those opposite, yet legitimate, needs, which express themselves from time to time, now in an increased austerity, now in a greater flexibility, with their various psychological repercussions, now for easy accommodation, now for careless acceptance, now for decisive action. It is this contrast which stiffens the irreconcilable dualism of the theologians on both sides. Instead of seeking a dialectic and immanent solution which would rationalize the two different aspects and their unity, they seek a solution which is abstract and transcendent and they must, therefore, of necessity deny providence and grace or deny freewill, or else (and this is what for the most part they do) combine them eclectically by means of transactions, subtleties and meaningless words. Yet beneath these theological controversies there surges a speculative motive, which, while it has been the effective motive in making the disputes impassioned, has also made them fruitful in philosophy. If philosophy has been disinterested, if instead it has on its part been appeased and rewarded, it is because from these controversies it has garnered the fruits.

REQUIEM FOR JOHN KEATS

ERNEST HARTSOCK

His was a life whose April stood
Like autumn bloody on a wood,

And like a perfect simile,
A splendor born of brevity.

His was the ardor of the lark
Whose voice of fire devours the dark;

Hope's harbinger and acolyte,
He burned the vampire wings of night

With stars in lightning's candlesticks
At Beauty's living crucifix.

Bereft of wine or bread by those
Whose rigor crucifies the rose,

He took the stone which malice sent
And made a deathless monument.

SYMPOSIUM: WHAT CONTRIBUTION DOES CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGY MAKE TO PHILOSOPHY?

I

A PHILOSOPHER LOOKS AT PSYCHOLOGY

BY HAROLD CHAPMAN BROWN

By respectable tradition philosophy is reputed the mother of the sciences. It is true that philosophers have always had to acquire some knowledge of the sort we call scientific as essential to the solutions of their special problems. Sometimes such investigations by philosophers have caused attention to permeate a range of fact so pungently that interest has been aroused in it for its own sake and then a special science is born. Psychology has but recently evoked this differentiating interest and taken her place in the world of sciences. Like an adolescent child, she is straining somewhat passionately to escape from the apron strings of her mother and likes to be taken into the games of her brother and sister sciences. She plays zestfully at physiology or statistics, and sometimes even borrows brother physics' electrons and protons. Yet there is a sort of unsureness in this play like that of the child not quite certain where its deeper interests will lie. Also, like the modern generation of children, psychology is a bit wayward and offers problems rather than security to her mother, who, like all mothers, hopes to see her child a credit to her sagacity, and at times may be somewhat oblivious of past errors in home training.

This is not said by way of disparaging psychology or philosophy. If philosophy is not to be a fruitless product of exuberant human imagination, it must take an interest in the proceedings of all sciences, young or old, and in all knowledge concerning the world and men. But knowledge is difficult to understand. Concepts and methods too often have a functional value in the hands of the skilled investigator quite different from the representative value they seem to have to the uninitiated and quite different too from the ontological meaning they may have for the philosopher. The older sciences have begun to recognize

these differences. They seek to breed philosophers and listen with eagerness to anyone who may have in some measure correctly evaluated their achievements for what they really are and who is not misled by what they may seem to be. Thus physics, chemistry, and biology have their philosophers. Psychology as yet, at least in England and America, has to have philosophy thrust upon it.

This should not be surprising. It is natural that one of the younger sciences, intent on finding out things for itself, is sceptical of a tradition that may have been shaped by a wisdom as to what seemed good to believe rather than by careful consideration of what the facts justify us in believing. It is healthy for such a science to try out the methods and concepts of other sciences provided only it does not lose its head and confuse nice exhibitions of methodological practice with a real advance in knowing. Formal success does not necessarily guarantee material success in such tryouts. To be afraid of philosophical considerations is a mark of immaturity. Where concepts are clear cut and methods sure, the scientist need not be anxious over the inroads of philosophy. Philosophy cannot change the factual basis or methods of his investigations but in its efforts to see them in perspective, to evaluate their significance for human life, it is no friend to vagueness or inadequacy. In one sense science is authoritative: the fact that it successfully employs certain sets of ideas proves that some aspect of reality may be fruitfully interpreted by means of them, but this is not the same as to say that all scientific concepts may be taken at their face value as fully adequate representations of all the reality in the situations to which they refer. Careful scientists usually recognize this, especially today when they have seen so many of their cherished ultimates pass away.

Psychology is just beginning to feel the pressure of philosophical analysis. Generally, when it has deigned to become philosophical at all, it has tried to adapt itself to tradition and shape its problems in terms of ancient philosophical conceptions of interactionism, parallelism, or double aspect theories. The

result has been, not the clarification of psychology, but the division of psychologists into schools, introspectionist, structuralist, functionalist, behaviorist, and the like. Of these the introspectionist and the behaviorist exhibit the most striking antithesis. The former talks a familiar language, whether his metaphysics is dualistic or some sort of double aspect theory. He deals with sensations, perceptions, emotions, will, and thought; in general, with those attributes that are popularly supposed to constitute mind. But the behaviorist will have none of this mentalistic language. He finds no mind in his laboratories. We may think we feel an emotion but are told that it is merely visceral and glandular activities that are taking place within our bodies; sensations are mere sense-contacts giving rise to action patterns; we believe we think, but are permitted only subvocal laryngeal movements; our cherished imagery collapses into nothing but a few conditioned reflexes.

This may all be true, or contain some truth. We should not blame the behaviorist if he chooses to confine himself to the study of human behavior and the physiological processes it involves. If, after careful observation, it is established that visceral processes are present during emotional upheavals or that subvocal movements are present in thinking, why they are there, and there is nothing the philosopher, or anyone else, can do to alter the situation. No philosophical demand ever prevented a physical or physiological process from taking place if it was the nature of things for it to do so. But it is quite another thing to claim that such processes, if occurrent, are all of the occurrence or that the whole situation can be adequately examined from the physiological point of view. If a physicist should tell us that our golf clubs were nothing but swarms of electrons and protons, we should probably utilize a Johnsonian method of refutation and challenge him to a game, hoping to demonstrate that our clubs do really function as golf clubs, and if swarms of electrons and protons, they are at least special kinds of swarms that can give him a run for his money at golf.

The behaviorist usually professes to be anti-metaphysical, but

we are all familiar with anti-metaphysical philosophies from Mach to Wittgenstein, and we know that they are really metaphysical, but in revolt against some particular type of metaphysics for which they covertly substitute a metaphysics of their own. Who flees metaphysics does it with wings borrowed from metaphysics. Mr. Watson, the high priest of the religion of behaviorism, professes to have nothing to do with philosophy. That is his right, if he will abstain from any remarks having a metaphysical status. It is perfectly legitimate to study the stimulus-response behavior of animal and human organisms and to refrain from introspective methods, other than the consideration of verbal reports, and the like, provided that nothing is assumed as a principle of explanation and nothing is reported as a discovery that cannot be reduced to the showings of these methods. When, however, Mr. Watson declines to use the word mind as denoting anything real, he is saying either that his work deals with a region of phenomena where the mental does not appear and that he does not find mind for the same reason that the mathematical physicist does not find genes and chromosomes—in which case behaviorism has nothing to do with psychology or with the philosophy of mind and can neither make nor mar it—or he is denying the existence of any sort of mind, a highly metaphysical statement, or he is affirming the justification of some new understanding of mind, also a metaphysical proposition.

In Mr. Watson's case, as in the case of other behaviorists, it is quite evident that unwillingness to use such terms as sensation, consciousness, or names denoting mental states, and the rejection of imagery as an instrument of thought or imagination in favor of speech mechanisms, is specifically due to a discrediting of certain traditional connotations that some philosophers, and after them some psychologists, have read into these terms. It is always a question for science when new knowledge throws old facts into a different light and expands their significance, whether new terms should be created or old ones should be stretched to cover the new meanings and be retained. When

analytic geometry was led to the introduction of a fourth range of variables, since such variables had no counterpart in the world of spatial experience, the term dimension could be extended to cover them or a new term could have been created, leaving the old to denote the characteristics of physical space. Much fruitless popular mysticism might have been averted by adopting a new term, but the scientist, a bit self-centered, did not worry about the public and conservatively extended the meaning of the familiar one. Then, wonted to a four dimensional geometry, it was an easy step to the recent acceptance of time as a fourth physical dimension although an unadjusted public has often exhibited an amusing confusion at the procedure.

The behaviorists have taken the opposite horn of this terminological dilemma. They have thrown away the vocabulary of mentalism and with some facts and terms borrowed from the physiologist or invented for their needs, are making a new assault on problems of a psychological sort. It is legitimate to wonder whether, in throwing away so much in the way of language, they may not have also lost sight of some facts that less radical investigators had correctly observed. Some of their vaunted discoveries, at least, are so much like the insights of an older psychology that there is room for the sincere suspicion that their work is at bottom nothing but a new method, and perhaps in some cases a cruder method, of getting at the same situations with which psychologists have always dealt. And here we are led to look more carefully at the presuppositions underlying the behavioristic approach to psychology.

The outstanding metaphysical assertion of behaviorists is that there is but one kind of ultimate substance, physical in character. This is what philosophers know as materialism, to most philosophers a doctrine accursed, and with it goes the equally distasteful doctrine of mechanism. Philosophical materialism, however, cannot be lightly dismissed. There is a prevalent tendency to say that modern physics has refuted the doctrine, but that is not true. Such materialisms as those of Holbach or Lamettrie, based on the conception of the atom as an ultimate

physical element, may be gone, but materialism is much older than the eighteenth century. If it is true, as some classical students report, that the atoms of Democritus were merely shaped air, and air was self-moving, modern physics is closer to that of the father of materialism than any scientific view since his time. Instead of destroying the doctrine modern science has returned to it in its original form. That materialism is disreputable, is merely an *argumentum ad hominem*. Its truth or falsity does not wait on such considerations. For that matter, the respectable naturalisms of contemporary philosophy are essentially materialistic at heart and have merely chosen the new name to avoid scandal.

Mechanism is probably a bad concept for the psychologist, because of its association with physical mechanics in the simple sense of a study of the relations of bodies in motion, and its association with the word machine, which tends to connote a relatively simple structure utilizing but few types of energy manifestations. What it really means in biology and psychology is lawfulness, that the subject matter of those sciences is nothing random or haphazard but can be reduced to some sort of orderly occurrence. But suppose organic behavior is lawful even to those parts of it which can be described as purposive actions in mentalistic terms, life remains what it is. The philosopher need not be disturbed. No intelligent moralist ever wanted a really causeless will, although he might describe the cause of a volition as, perhaps, the idea of the good. It would be empirically absurd to deny that this idea, or any other, may not influence behavior, in the same sense that influences are found anywhere in nature. Nor can the moralist object to any true explanation of how an idea came to occur or to become relevant to the situation in which a choice is made. The really important thing about a doctrine of freedom for him is the assertion that character can be developed and modified and that ideas are not insignificant for the determination of what we do.

Such facts are open to experimental verification and their acceptance is a commonplace of educational practice. Behavi-

orist and mentalist train their children much as do the rest of us. They and we make mistakes, think them over and try to correct them. Sometimes they and we try to improve bad temper by diet, and sometimes by moral suasion. Knowledge of behavior reactions is surely useful, so is knowledge of physiology and so is knowledge of mental processes. We all do the same sort of things in such educational situations when we find they work, whether we hiss or applaud the term mechanism. We all believe in a certain orderliness akin to law relevant to these as well as to other matters. One can quite understand that the moralist should be a little annoyed at the cry of "mere mechanism" and should be tempted to take advantage of hiatuses in knowledge to assert something different from the physical and the mechanical. This may do more credit to his heart than to his head but it is, at least, a manifestation of the fact that human beings easily irritate one another and that irritation produces bad judgment—a good behavioristic doctrine although hard to translate into strictly physiological terms. One can equally well understand the behaviorist's scorn of the sentimentalities in which mentalists sometimes indulge.

Philosophers and psychologists alike need to take to heart the truth that science is fundamentally descriptive and aims at disclosing the effective relations that exist between things. Its tests are verifiable predictions. The world is not transformed by science, although science may give men instrumentalities by which they can shape their environment more nearly to the heart's desire. Whatever is real about the effective value of the love and hate of men, their thought, or their aspirations, remains real no matter in what terms we describe the process by which they are carried out. What is, is, and what is not, is not. Have the stars moved differently since Newton subsumed their motions under the laws of gravitation? Not even Einstein can make laws other than they are. Materialism is, therefore, a conception that may be true or false but need not be feared as essentially base.

One of the most amusing dogmas of modern scientific philos-

ophy that is sure bait for catching behaviorists, and most other psychologists, for they are all morbidly afraid of being unscientific, has been vigorously and frankly stated by Max Meyer: "Modern science," he says, ". . . has learned to restrict itself to describing merely that which we can measure." It is amusing, for the assertion is true of no science. The mathematician often concerns himself with projective geometry, analysis situs, and group theory, yet none of these has anything to do with measurement. The physicist cannot state the difference between the electron and proton in terms of quantity and the rival corpuscular and wave theories of light are not distinguished by quantitative discriminations. The biological sciences are little concerned with what can be significantly measured. Even psychology, although it is straining every nerve to stick to the measurable, frequently falls from grace. Sherrington's *Integrative Action of the Nervous System* is not primarily concerned with measurement and certainly Freud or Jung pay little attention to the measurable. Is the behaviorist's own identification of thought with sub-vocal speech movements a product of measurement? This is not to imply an attack on quantitative science. Measurement is a highly useful auxiliary device where it is appropriate, but it is not all science.

Certainly behaviorism has many important achievements to its credit. It is noteworthy that, although it tries to abstain from mentalistic terms, nevertheless it substitutes quite systematically some known or hypothecated physiological process for each. Indeed it is sufficiently free with such hypotheses so that neurologists hold a little aloof in apprehension lest the imagined neurology of the psychologist may not conform to the actual neurology of the anatomist. But this very attempt to reconstruct in terms of organic processes what the non-behavioristic psychologists have been discussing as mental processes suggests that it may be possible to reconcile the different psychologies as to their metaphysics, although of course not always as to their interpretations of special phenomena, where some may be right and the other wrong, and also to bring psychology into metaphysical relations with other sciences.

The fact that science is possible indicates that whatever reality may be, it can be analytically interpreted as a hierarchy of entities having both structural and qualitative aspects. Neither the structural account of it nor the qualitative characterization of it can stand alone or is sufficient to define the knowable nature of any moment of it for any science, nor has either the structural or the qualitative aspect of reality ever been shown to vary independently of the other. In human investigations, which of these aspects stands in the foreground depends not upon the nature of what is investigated but upon the problem and purposes of the investigator and the tools, conceptual or physical, he brings to the investigation. For example, the physicist finds the answers to his questions concerning the behavior of light most easily when he thinks of light in terms of its structure, but the painter can best analyse and reproduce a specific effect of light in terms of qualitative aspects of the situation. Yet physicist and painter may deal with the same reality, light. It is quite conceivable that invented aids to vision might make the painter's method of qualitative observation fruitful for solving physical problems, or that inventions of subtle physical apparatus might make the physicist's procedure serviceable to the painter.

If specific regions of reality can be discriminated as entities, it must be true that reality is varied in such a fashion that structural analyses of qualitatively distinguished regions are generally possible. Also similar qualitative regions will have similar structures, and diverse structures. This is true on every level of physical complexity and with reference to entities on the same or on different levels. It follows that in talking about things in either set of terms, qualitative or structural, we are talking about the same things but approached from different points of view. Either approach results in an abstraction but there is no more conflict between them than there would be between such statements as that my study table is brown and that it is pine. Both are statements about the same table, although

one may be more serviceable for the interior decorator and the other for the carpenter who has to repair it.

The physical sciences certainly demand such a double aspect interpretation of the realities with which they deal, and double aspect theories of reality are familiar in both psychology and philosophy. Usually, however, the duality is thought of as between the mental and the extended, instead of between the qualitative and the structural. The advantage of stating it as qualitative-structural is that it does not force us to assume the mental character of all qualities or lead to the confusion of extending the idea of the mental to all nature either as a world-soul or as a pan-psychism. If things in general are merely distinguishable space-time regions that have differentiating structural and qualitative characteristics and behave in a special fashion, it is quite possible that mind should simply be one of such things. If our interest in things generally is primarily directed toward what they do and how they do it and other characteristics of them derive interest as signs that can be connected with such functioning, then there is strength in behavioristic psychology. Conscious beings can do many things that unconscious ones cannot. Naturally, if consciousness is the name for what occurs qualitatively when certain structures are present and functioning, it involves differentiating qualitative aspects as well as underlying physiological structures. The peculiar qualities involved are, however, no more mysterious as mental than are any of the other qualities that are found in purely physical occurrences.

The animal body is a physical object. It has its special organization different in character from that of any other physical objects and we should expect related qualitative differences that can appear as mental content. Much has been made of the privacy of these qualities but the question of privacy or of publicity is the question as to whether characteristics can directly evoke integrated responses from one or more than one person. There may be real qualities that cannot evoke such responses at all, that is, qualities than can be observed by nobody because of their physical locus, or conditions of occurrence such as the qualities

of the other side of the moon or of the electron. Some are accessible to only one observer for some special reason such as those of the inside of my study when I am there with the door closed, or those of the interior organism to which others lack the proper nerve connections to respond. The last sorts have the difference in physical status that I can throw open the door of my study and invite the public to view it but I cannot throw open the door of my organism. This is an empirical difference but not a metaphysical one. Many mental qualities that are supposed to be strictly private are observed by others in a certain sense. In the same fashion that I *see* that ice is slippery, I see that you are happy, puzzled, thoughtful, or in pain. The ice does not perceive that it is slippery, for it cannot make an integrated response to its own slipperiness as you can to your state of mind. Quite possibly some organic qualities that function in mental life are quite narrowly localized in specific organic structures and others are probably almost coextensive with the totality of organic structural processes. Localized aches and pains would be of the first sort and such a state as being thoroughly happy would be of the second. The object about which our behavior is integrated and of which we say we are conscious may be of either sort, a qualified object outside ourselves, when we "forget ourselves" in some activity, or within ourselves, when we are moved to visit the dentist by an aching tooth.

In such facts lie both the merit and the defect of behaviorism as psychology. Unless the organism is an exception to the general qualitative-structural character of the rest of reality, there is no reason why the psychologist should avoid mentalistic language except as a methodological device, or because of the possible infection of such language with the idols of the market place. It is quite possible that introspectionist and behaviorist are actually talking about the same realities in so far as their statements are factually true. If one emotion is a synthesis of two or more others, then it is probably true that the visceral and glandular processes involved in its occurrence are the visceral and glandular processes involved in those synthesized to consti-

tute it. This resolves the conflict between introspectionists and behaviorists as schools of psychology to mere differences as to the preferred method in approaching their data. The advantage of either approach should be manifest in its results. If one had to describe the pattern of a sidewalk constructed of variegated bricks, the same results could be attained from working in terms of divergencies from the mean level of surface points and the light refracting characteristics of the bricks as from noting their roughness and colors. Within the limits of the investigation, convenience dictates the choice of procedure. Why should it not be so with psychologies? The psychologist who prefers one method over another, say the behavioristic, has the same justification as the chemist who chooses to devote himself to quantitative analysis rather than qualitative or the physicist who chooses to be an experimentalist rather than a mathematical physicist, but he should be content with the discoveries the chosen approach facilitates and not feel obliged to construct a system of psychology in terms of his special interests. Who, by the way, ever expects a physicist or a chemist to construct a complete system of physics or chemistry? Perhaps the psychologist is here tainted with a misuse of his philosophic inheritance.

It is another matter when psychologists diverge concerning matters of fact. As I understand it, for example, the gestalt psychology is based on the hypotheses that complex attitudes of response are primary developments and that simple reflexes develop as a sort of disintegration of these, instead of on the hypothesis that simple reflexes are primary and complex attitudes due to some acquired integration of them. This is a question of fact and there is no reason why the gestalt problem cannot be approached either from the mentalistic or the behavioristic angle. Philosophy, however interested it may be in the consequences of pronouncing a verdict of true in favor of either party in such a dispute, has nothing to do with determination of the result. If a philosopher seems to intervene on such occasions it is because necessity or interest has led him to become

something of a scientist, for a philosopher may also be a scientist as well as a scientist be also a philosopher.

The successes and failures of the varied types of psychology become understandable if this dualism of the qualitative and structural in nature is recognized. There is the great possible value in the behavioristic careful recording of the varied types of response initiated by varying stimuli and, so far as they can be correctly disclosed, it is highly important to note exactly what takes place in the nervous, muscular, and visceral systems during the complex activities of men. But it is dangerous to develop too many speculative specifications of such processes without adequate empirical evidence or to try to simplify human behavior to make it fit such processes as are known. Speculations too easily become dogma and it requires the greatest scientific maturity to keep hypotheses in their proper place. The behaviorist is sometimes guilty on these counts. Naturally he is most successful when he is dealing with the simpler types of behavior and less so when he is concerned with actions usually said to involve the higher mental processes. We have as yet so few clues as to the details of the physiology underlying the latter. It may be possible to discover exactly what makes a baby exhibit fear or anger responses and to note many of the physiological changes involved in them, but when we try to give an account of a man in love, jealous, or even thinking, the description is not so easy. To dismiss thought as mere sub-vocal speech is to fail to distinguish between the processes of the student who memorizes confused, ill-understood lecture notes and reproduces them on request and the man who has learned in such a way that he lives differently and better, because of the knowledge he has acquired.

No doubt the thoughtful behaviorist would recognize and interpret this distinction, but certainly the popularization of his expressed theory is having a most pernicious effect on our elementary education by the halo in which it exhibits mere verbal learning. Thinking is without doubt a process resulting in new attitudes or lines of possible action with respect to some situa-

tion and it also involves neuro-physiological processes amongst which sub-vocal speech mechanisms may be important. They are surely not its sole elements and they may not even be always present. Behaviorists assume them because their theory needs them and unfortunately, as a school, they are prone to a certain dogmatism that makes some of us suspect them at times of lapses into the attitude, if the facts don't fit the theory, so much the worse for the facts. The claim can be well substantiated that the introspectionist has perhaps still something to tell us about thinking that physiological and behavioristic methods are as yet incapable of disclosing.

The advantage of the introspectionist is in dealing with these more subtle processes. In spite of the argument about the public character of scientific facts in general and the privacy of introspective fact, even the behaviorist has to listen to verbal reports and interpret them much as the introspectionist does. In spite of all theory, we do believe that our experiences in being angry, in suffering, and in joy, are not unlike the experiences of others who "report" these states. My dentist believes me when I tell him he hurts me, or I should go to some one else, nor do I think he would be satisfied with the behavioristic interpretation that the words "you hurt" coming from my lips are a mere sign that the portion of his income derived from me will cease if he does not modify his procedure. He knows what "hurts" means as private experience. It may be scientifically unfortunate that we cannot directly experience the organic qualitative conditions of others, but all sciences accept facts that cannot be directly experienced. The testimony of a substance as to the structure of its molecules is no more indirect than the testimony of a man as to his states of consciousness. Also we need not discredit a lone observer, if he is of good character and in a position favorable for observation. The special character of introspection calls for extra scientific caution, but it is only a specious dialectic dogmatism that insists that it is scientifically ruinous.

The real reproach to introspectionists is a tendency to devote themselves to futile tasks such as a search for mental elements,

or that sort of literary analysis for which James reproves the psychology of the early nineteenth century. It is probably a false hypothesis that complex psychological qualities can be conceived as compounds of simple qualities. To note sensory elements in an emotional state, for example, does not give us the quality of the emotion. It may indicate physiological processes that are present when it occurs, but theory stands in the way of letting these interest the introspectionist. Also one may be permitted to doubt the significance of a statement like Dunlap's that emotions are complexes made up of simple feelings plus bodily sensations, or their images plus relations. What does "plus" mean in such statements, surely not simple addition or mere coexistence? Or again, is a volition merely an emotional state involving ideas of a future condition together with a desire or repugnance for that condition? If so, I have never experienced a volition. Just as the behaviorist cuts himself off from useful observations by a dogmatism that he can't live up to, so the introspectionist is often hampered by an unwillingness to avail himself of physiological knowledge and a lack of attention to conduct.

It must be admitted that the notion that ideas and images themselves imply a physiological structure as well as a qualitative appearance is, at present, more or less of a postulate. It is easy to imagine a physiological basis for such mental occurrences in terms of sensory organic conditions or conditioned reflexes that would fulfil the proper function in replacing them in the organic system, but it would be difficult to demonstrate the actual occurrences of these in every case. The progress of modern physiology in approaching such explanations, however, is sufficiently promising so that such hypotheses should be fostered. At least that is my personal belief based on the existing evidence. Whether the philosopher likes it or not, I think the physiologists and psychologists are going to compel him to accept something of the sort sooner or later. It is a fact that the exact physiological aspect of my idea, e. g., that "Hegel's Logic is hard reading," is at present impossible to point out specifically

although it undoubtedly involves sensory, kinaesthetic, muscular, glandular, and visceral processes. But to deny it an adequate physiological aspect because this cannot be completely specified, is an illegitimate appeal to proof from ignorance and unworthy of a logician. There can be no real doubt that at present our more complex mental life is most fruitfully discussed in mentalistic terms and only time will tell how far these may come to be replaced by physiological ones, if they ever are. The pragmatic criterion of success will eventually decide the issue, but it is not a matter to be settled by philosophical argument.

Scientific advance always involves something of a leap in the dark. The assumption that the mental world can be understood as an aspect of certain structures occurring in the physical world involves such a leap. It may, of course, be false, but if so, its falsity can only be discovered by trying out the value of the hypothesis as an interpretation of what can be observed. It does not refute a tentative theory to say that it cannot be completely substantiated. Refutation must come, if at all, from finding facts that cannot be harmonized with it. If we had adequate knowledge of the physiology of the brain, nervous system, endocrine glands, and muscular processes, and then could show the occurrence of an idea in the absence of any unique set of such processes, we should be compelled to accept an ontological dualism of mind and matter, and perhaps, an independence of structural and qualitative processes in general. That we shall be so compelled seems almost daily less probable, but philosopher and scientist can await the outcome unperturbed. The sun and moon are reported to have stood still for Joshua, but he was a prophet and not a scientist or philosopher. The earth did not stand still for Aristotle, but we have all gotten along somehow in the post-Copernican world and we probably shall survive in the post-Einsteinian and post-Watsonian, if we must. Human virtues will not be changed nor human aspirations brought to naught if it be proven that they are not merely founded on the mental but are also expressions of complex physiological adjustments.

In the terms of scientific romance, there is the possibility that some super-surgeon of the future, who will probably live long after we have solved the problem of inter-planetary travel, may learn to operate upon a man in such a fashion as to change him from a dub into a golfer, or from an ass into a wit. What of it? We sometimes accomplish something of the sort now by arduous training and submit ourselves to such training without the loss of dignity. As educators, our life work is trying to modify systems of ideas by speech or writing. What if we do get thereby new action patterns in our pupils' nervous systems and so accomplish an actual physiological change? It is best at present to describe education both as to process and result in mentalistic and appreciative terms, but that does not belie the possibility that there may be another possible description of it in physiological terms that is equally valid. That the physical world has far richer potentialities than a mere mechanical atomism can disclose is the testimony of most of modern science. If life turns out to be a peculiar dynamic state of matter, it is a very complex and interesting state, and if mind turns out to be a complex physiological structure that can also be qualitatively viewed, it thereby loses nothing of its interest or value.

It would be of the greatest interest to philosophy, if psychology should succeed in justifying the application of the concept of a structural-qualitative dual-aspect interpretation of nature to those processes generally called conscious, and equally interesting if it can refute it. There is perhaps no more fundamental philosophical question than whether man can be conceived as existing within nature, as an object however complex yet a part of the cosmic setting, or whether he must be conceived as something essentially alien to nature, ontologically different from it. If psychologists can only get together there is no reason why they should not accumulate significant evidence on this point. On their part, philosophers must keep ever in mind that nothing can be lost through science that is true and nothing can be gained by resisting verified knowledge or by inventing false knowledge to feign objectivity for traditional assumptions. One

oft assumed entity may be lost, the ghost soul of the spiritualists, as chemistry has lost phlogiston. At least the evidence is not very strong at present for the reality of departed and returning spirits. If any of us who are still prone to affirm them, have to give them up—or for that matter, if those of us who do not believe are forced to admit more things in heaven and earth than are dreamed of in our philosophies—well, it is just too bad. It will not be the first time in the history of human efforts to know that facts have spoken louder than theories, nor will it probably be the last.

II

THE INFLUENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY UPON PHILOSOPHY

BY ETHEL SABIN-SMITH

I propose in this paper to make three main points: first, that with regard to their influence upon philosophy the agreement between behavioristic and gestalt psychologists is more important than their differences; second, that the mechanistic tendency in behaviorism is an advantage and not, as sometimes claimed, a defect; and, third, that in philosophy today the interpretation of value and meaning turns frequently upon behavioristic concepts.

When one is rash enough to attempt to trace influences literary or scientific, the counsel of safety is to have recourse to the phrase "In the beginning"; but for one discussing modern philosophical or psychological influences an alternative exists. One may begin with the words "In the writings of William James."

It was a quarter of a century ago that James published a paper¹ entitled "Does Consciousness Exist?" in which he expressed his view that consciousness regarded as a substantive must yield to the view that consciousness is a relation. If we scrutinize the movements known in psychology as behaviorism and gestalt respectively, we find in these psychologies unmistakable fruition of that view. They are in agreement on the fact

¹In the *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*.

that to study any aspect of mental life a psychologist must observe objectively verifiable relationships between the organism and the environment, and that, in the main, the psychologist's problem is sufficiently overwhelming and complex if he confines his attention to the first term in that relationship: the organism, as-acted-upon, or as-acting, and accepts what is left to him of the second term, the environment, as it is offered to him by chemists, physicists and philosophers after each in turn has had his teeth in it.

Yet even with a common heritage, behaviorism and gestalt psychology have their fraternal differences. Gestalt psychology claims that behaviorism, to use James' famous figure, has poured out the baby along with the bath. Gestalt psychologists say that in its effort to escape from consciousness as an entity, it has described behavior as a compound of reflexes, and so has, for its pains, a type of behavior which is a mechanically connected mosaic, instead of *conscious* behavior, a functional unity. Of course behaviorists deny the charge as a misunderstanding of integration and point to such impressive work as Sherrington's on the *Integrative Action of the Nervous System* and Pawlow's on *Conditioned Reflexes* and a wealth of special studies to support their case.

Gestalt psychologists follow up their attack on behaviorism by reminding us that as early as 1893 Dewey pointed out logical difficulties in the reflex arc concept,¹ and add that experimentation carried on by such men as Koffka, Lashley and Franz has further tended to discredit the theory of preformed pathways in the nervous system and so has brought into doubt an assumption fundamental to a behavioristic account of summation of separate reflexes.

One is reminded in this connection a second time of James. In a lecture delivered at Oxford entitled "The Compounding of Consciousness," James deplored the futility of attempting to explain consciousness as a synthesis of discrete elements. Now gestalt psychologists maintain that Watson and his immediate

¹Wheeler, *Science of Psychology*, 483ff.

followers have persisted in applying this conventional, though discredited, logic of atomism to the description of behavior as a compound of nerve impulses, reflexes, and glandular responses—all integrated to be sure, but undeniably put together from parts.

But this difference, significant as it is for psychologists, and interesting as perhaps showing the effect of philosophy upon psychology, becomes of minor importance when we consider the effect upon philosophy of these two dominant psychological movements. What philosophy is bound to feel is their common emphasis upon objective method, upon precise measurement, upon statistical evaluation. In short, approach the conscious relationships of the organism from what angle he chooses, so long as the philosopher takes one of these psychologists as a companion, he must approach mechanistically.

In the rest of this paper therefore I shall refer to both gestalt and behavioristic psychologists as behaviorists. Koehler, so closely identified with gestalt psychology, speaks of himself as a behaviorist, though not, he says, of "the dogmatic type."¹

Unfortunately certain philosophers have a "fear conditioning" in regard to the term mechanism. Witness Dr. Broad, who in his book *The Mind and its Place in Nature* made an attack upon behaviorism as a "silly" theory (p. 56). "By a silly theory," he wrote, "I mean one which may be held at the time when one is talking or writing professionally but which only an inmate of a lunatic asylum would think of carrying into daily life." "I count Behaviorism taken quite strictly . . . as 'silly' in this sense. No one in his senses can in practise regard himself or his friends or his enemies simply as ingenious machines produced by other machines. . . . Only very acute and learned men could have thought of anything so odd or defended anything so preposterous against the continual protests of common sense."

Toward the end of his book (pp. 612-624), Dr. Broad shows why the behavioristic position is empty of value. He demon-

¹*Powell Lectures on Psychological Theory*. Clark University, 1925.

strates that the attempt to argue that "being a sensation of so and so" and "being a bit of bodily behavior of such and such a kind" are just two names for the same characteristic is evidently hopeless. And this he says is what the behaviorist has really got to do (p. 623).

If I mistake not, Dr. Broad has been guilty of exactly the same fault in reasoning in this connection which Santayana criticized under the caption of "Malicious psychology,"¹ for he reaches the conclusion that when a notion has been clarified and reduced to its elements, it is *ipso facto* deprived of its function, whereas the opposite position seems luminously self evident to behaviorists, namely that they may study structure as a medium of expression for function.

Behaviorists of all degrees, from Watson to Koffka, analyze in terms of organic response what it means to see a patch of red, for example, but it does not occur to them, as it does to their critics, that the consciousness of red, i. e., the functional relationship to the stimulus, has escaped from the situation, while they have been preoccupied with a precise statement of the behavior of the organism. Still less does it seem necessary to them to reinstate as a phenomenon of emergent materialism, a substantive consciousness which they are united in declaring a fiction. Small wonder when Dr. Broad so signally misunderstands the contribution of behavioristic psychology he should dismiss the contribution of all modern psychology to philosophy in the following sweeping terms (p. 664): "But so far as I can see there are not even the beginnings of a scientific psychology of the individual or of communities."

As it happens, however, one does not have to read far to discover that Dr. Broad is not the only philosopher who discounts the contribution of modern psychology to the philosophical wealth of the world. And disconcertingly enough to one who believes as I do, that psychology is contributing richly to modern philosophy, this doubt of the value of its contribution comes from one of the quarters where one expects warmest apprecia-

¹*Little Essays*, 168.

tion. One expects appreciation of behavioristic psychology from the neo-realists, who consider mind as a particular type of the organism's activity, and also from pragmatists whether instrumentalists or humanists. However, Professor Otto in his paper on "Instrumentalism," republished in the volume of essays entitled *Philosophy Today*, summarizes under three points the difficulties which instrumentalists have in reconciling their views with behaviorists. The first point is identical with Dr. Broad's, namely, that behaviorists have made psychology a branch of mechanical physics; the second is that they reject so-called "experience" as a tissue of illusion and accept as real only the world of electron and proton; and the third, that they leave no room for meaning to arise since they confuse language with the signal reflexes of animals.¹ I feel that Dr. Otto has done both behaviorism and instrumentalism a service by thus crystalizing into a careful indictment the philosophical barrenness of behaviorism as instrumentalists see it. What they see is perhaps not so much barrenness as menace, the menace of mechanism. Whereby, to paraphrase Santayana again, the notion of consciousness has been clarified and reduced to its elements and is *ipso facto* supposed to be deprived of its function.

A behaviorist interested in refuting the third charge that the behavioristic account of language leaves no room for meaning could point to Professor Allport's account of the development of the language habits of the infant,² a brilliant example of a behavioristic explanation of the genesis of language through the conditioning of reflexes, which takes adequate and specific cognizance of the dawn of meaning and its later enrichment.

I doubt that any behaviorist would take the instrumentalists' second objection, that he is despoiling the universe, very seriously, since, as I have said, the behaviorist is quite willing to hand over the environment to his brother scientists and to philosophers, provided only they will lend it to him to use on occasion as a stimulus. But the first charge remains that behaviorists

¹*Philosophy Today*, 49-50.

²In his *Social Psychology*.

interpret behavior mechanistically. It remains, but with this difference, that what their critics consider a limitation and a defect, behaviorists themselves acclaim as their charter of scientific procedure.

Yet for all that, for the behaviorist to be committed to denying teleology to intelligence in its functioning, merely because he measures it, is as absurd as to commit the comparative anatomist to denying life to sharks because he busies himself with dissection of obviously lifeless specimens.

Dewey, speaking of this aspect in discussing the dependence of a science of morals upon psychology, said: "Psychological analysis is the instrument by which character is transformed from its absorption in the values of immediate experience into an objective scientific fact."¹

The following statement from Santayana is in a similar vein: "Rational morality is an embodiment of volition, not a description of it. . . . It leaves to psychology and history a free field for the *description* of moral phenomena. It has no interest in slipping far-fetched and incredible myths beneath the facts of nature, so as to lend a non-natural origin to human aspirations. It even recognizes, as an emanation of its own force, that *uncompromising truthfulness with which science assigns all forms of moral life to their place in the mechanical system of nature.*"²

To illustrate the dependence of philosophy upon psychological analysis for the objective content of certain of its dominant concepts, let us compare David Hume's use of the concept "taste" with Santayana's. Each reflects the current psychological knowledge of his period. Hume was the heir of the psychological tradition in regard to instincts, according to which they were regarded as forms of foreknowledge, or subtle prescience, capable of some refinement by training but capable also of functioning precisely and cunningly in the absence of training. So it was natural that when Hume wrote of a "man of taste" he

¹Joseph Ratner, *The Philosophy of John Dewey*, 336.

²*Little Essays*, 244.

meant by the phrase a person with an innate faculty of distinguishing the beautiful from the ugly in the kindred realms of ethical and aesthetic judgments. In quite different vein does Santayana speak of taste, as a predisposition to certain judgments left as a residue from moments of heightened experience and he, no less than Hume, reflects the current psychology of his day, since instincts in the Humean sense are today out of fashion. Contrast, then, with Hume's position the following statement by Santayana: "Taste is formed in those moments when aesthetic emotion is massive and distinct; preferences then grow conscious, judgments then put into words will reverberate through calmer hours: they will constitute prejudices, habits of apperception, secret standards for all other beauties. Youth in these matters governs maturity, and while men may develop their early impressions more systematically and find confirmation of them in various quarters they will seldom look at the world afresh or use new categories in deciphering it. Half our standards come from our first masters, and the other half from our first loves."¹

Just as taste has been thus reduced by Santayana to the concretions of habit, so, too, has will. Dewey repeatedly declares that habit is will, agreeing with behavioristic psychologists that will as an entity for whose freedom philosophers once fought, bled and died, is no more. The sharp distinction of fifty years ago between will and habit is wiped out, for the moments in which we use our so-called will-power most persistently and with greatest emotional strength, are precisely those in which our most deeply entrenched batteries of habit have been threatened with some check.

If it is too much to claim that behavioristic psychology is a dominant influence upon modern ethical theory, at least we cannot fail to notice their parallel assumptions in regard to the nature of self. I am aware that when one points to Hobhouse's conception of a just order of society as one in which individual potentialities may be developed to their fullest and claims that

¹*Little Essays*, 118.

this conception of the good is only fully intelligible when character is viewed in the light of behavioristic analysis, aware I say, that any student of Plato may arise to protest that Plato defined justice in similar fashion long before Hobhouse, and that Plato had not had the opportunity of enlightenment at the hands of the behaviorists.

Let us remind ourselves in this connection that it has ever been the privilege of philosophical genius to anticipate conclusions in advance of a complete analysis of the body of facts upon which they rest. Thus we are told that Dr. Johnson when asked: "Which are more intelligent, men or women?" thundered back the answer: "Which man? Which woman?"—and this prior to the work of Thorndike or Terman.

The attitude of Professor Perry toward morality in his early book, *The Moral Economy*, is consonant with behaviorism. He says (p. 2): "For to be moral is simply to be intelligent, to be right-minded and open-minded in this unavoidable business of living. Morality is a collection of formulas and models based solidly on experiences of acts and their consequences," and again (p. 7), "The nucleus of morality is verified truth, the precipitate of mankind's prolonged experiment in living."

If Professor Perry is correct, then the application of statistical method to moral problems is in order and we can sympathize with Dr. Pitkin's attempt to *measure* moral attitudes by the experiment involving a ranking of the Ten Commandments by a large group of people. When we take such studies seriously we have travelled far from the naive psychology underlying stoicism, which resulted in the ethical doctrine that there were no degrees of turpitude or virtue, and we have travelled in the direction of behavioristic psychology, which holds that all things that can be studied, including intelligence, and moral attitude and will, are measurable and susceptible of statistical treatment.

Interesting parallels to their doctrine concerning moral attitudes are to be found in aesthetic theory. Professor Prall in his recent book *Aesthetic Judgment* writes (p. 26): "The two

cases of seeing a prospect as beautiful and seeing it as not beautiful are most probably cases of the relative intensity or volume of the processes going on. But at a sufficiently low degree of intensity, due to any of a thousand causes, such as digestion or a very low temperature, which may absorb energy or distract attention, or sorrow, which sometimes reduces all vitality nearly to coma and so on and on, at such a low intensity the feeling is almost nil and the beauty has faded or quite vanished. In extreme cases, of course, the processes of apprehension may be actually unpleasant on account of other concurrent bodily processes, and the object which was delightful, may now be directly offensive to sight."

One of the most interesting applications of behavioristic psychology to aesthetic interpretism is Professor Langfeld's explanation of the feeling of unreality which we experience in the presence of surpassing beauty.¹ It is the experience which Pater was describing when he spoke of the element of strangeness in all beauty. Langfeld explains this phenomenon as due to the blocking of our customary practical responses to the environment, by the relatively rare and unaccustomed response toward a consummatory value, toward some aspect of the environment as an end in itself instead of an instrument to a further goal. Let me take a simple example: doorways, in so far as we are aware of them, set up in us as a rule responses of approaching and entering, and so certainly can we count on these responses that we use pictures of doorways on our Christmas cards as uttering the very language of hospitality and we rely upon the drawing appeal of "The Worn Door-Step" or "The Open Door" as signs over inns and tea shops. But on a day we may chance to see a doorway in Salem, which apart from all uses of life is literally "its own excuse for being," and as we stand entranced, with no impulse to move toward the door, but content merely to gaze, this haunting-dreamlike sense of strangeness which Langfeld describes, arises from the blocking of our customary responses.

¹*The Aesthetic Attitude*, 65-69.

These are but random examples from the fields of ethics and aesthetics of the fashion in which ethical and aesthetic values are grounded upon behavioristic accounts of consciousness by various writers. A similar account might be rendered, if time permitted, in the field of logic, where truth as "the simplest explanation of the data in hand" is a value of surpassing preciousness, because it affords a consistent *modus operandi* for bodily responses.

It is sometimes held that even if modern psychology affects practical philosophy it is without influence upon ontology and epistemology, but this is a position open to some doubt. Take the philosophy of Dewey for example. We must grant his habit of significant utterance. In the *Essays on Experimental Logic* (p. 21) he writes that the *Essays* in their psychological phases are written from the standpoint of what is now termed behavioristic psychology. Any one familiar with the volume knows that its bearing is quite as much epistemological as logical.

It is from such evidences as this that I conclude that modern psychology is influencing philosophy. Furthermore, I believe that only in so far as it is completely mechanistic in purpose and method can it serve philosophy safely. A half-hearted mechanism will give no results of value. What the philosopher needs from the psychologist, as from the physicist, are rigidly tested data, statistically evaluated data, and data secured in the first instance by the use of instruments of high precision. It is on such books as C. Judson Herrick's *The Thinking Machine*, or Karl O. Lashley's *Brain Mechanisms and Intelligence* that the philosopher can safely build. Such philosophers as reject behavioristic contributions because they are too mechanistic may be revealing a lingering bias for the soul-substance theory, incarnated now, when we had thought it safely buried, and masquerading as a crusader in the cause of Values-in-distress. It carries a militant banner inscribed "Meaning cannot come from the merely mechanical! Values cannot come from the Indifferent!" and this in spite of the testimony of each moment to life's

supreme miracle: the emergence of meanings as correlates of needs.

I like to remember Aristotle's neat and whimsical way of assigning to the philosopher his task. "It is the function of the philosopher to be able to investigate all things," he said. "For if it is not the function of the philosopher, who is it will inquire whether Socrates, and Socrates seated are the same thing?"

But if the philosopher is to keep to his task, no less is the scientist to keep to his. We do not ask that our garage mechanic shall successfully refute the Eleatic paradoxes of space before we pay his bill for aligning the wheels, nor should we ask that the psychologist who tests our child shall define for us in philosophical terms the meaning of intelligence. That he shall be able to define it, and evaluate it, in terms of behavior is as essential as for a mechanic to be able to distinguish between a body-bolt and the timer.

Naturally it sometimes happens that the psychologist is a philosopher as well and has subjected himself to philosophical as well as psychological discipline. But in that case let us distinguish between his utterances as scientist and as philosopher.

The relation of philosophy to psychology is like its relation to any other science. It must constantly look to the sciences for enrichment by clearly presented, clearly formulated facts. The use and evaluation of these concepts in the business of living is still the vast task of philosophy.

III

PSYCHOLOGIES AND PHILOSOPHIES

BY SHEPHERD IVORY FRANZ

The matter of the symposium is one that I should feel very hesitant to discuss, largely because it is unseemly for a giver, if he gives, to extol the value of his gift to the receiver. On the other hand, however, I can come to the discussion with a clear social conscience because I shall deny that whatever philosophy has found on her doorstep has been donated by recent psychology, either behavioristic or Gestalt.

The problems of philosophy, as I understand them, are broad. They may be represented by two questions, respectively, "What exists?" and "How do we know?" Both of these questions have been answered often, and answered differently at different times. Some answers have been acceptable for a generation or two, others have been temporarily accepted but replaced by others in a few years. Some answers have been acceptable to only the individual who has given the answer, other answers have been widely adopted. To-day it appears that there are adherents of nearly all the different views which have been put forth, although the original constructions may have been architecturally changed. Because of this it seems appropriate to speak of philosophies rather than of philosophy.

The problems in psychology are less broad than those of the philosophies. Moreover the fields are better defined. Although psychological views differ, the differences are not as diverse as those of the philosophers. Of the psychological structures I feel more competent to speak than I do of the philosophies. We shall, I think, be better able to understand the situation as we look for a few moments at the course of development of modern psychology, and then for a few moments at the outcome of the studies of both behaviorists and the adherents of the Gestalt school.

Because philosophers thought of mind, or a mental condition or phenomenon, as one of the fundamental items to be considered in their inquiries about "What is?" and "How do we know?" they were the main cultivators in the field of psychology for many centuries. Nevertheless, because of the seeming intimate relation of the problems of sensation, ideas, feelings, and reactions to the observation of phenomena in the physical world and to physiological conditions in human individuals, the investigators in the latter fields also sporadically dug and cultivated relatively small areas. The self-observation, or introspection, of the philosophers was the tool of these early physicists and physiologists, although the latter groups tended to experiment in those senses of the term as applied to their own main endeavors.

It was from the latter combination—philosophical-psychological interests of physicists and physiologists—that psychology can be said to have developed as an independent or relatively independent discipline, although somewhat cultivated in subsequent years by those who were primarily philosophically minded. The problems in the new science remained, in fact, relatively philosophical. Disguised though they were in part they were intended largely to answer the questions of “What is?” and “How do we know?” in that they were analytic or anatomic. They pointed in the direction of sensation and of reaction, of what the experience consisted and by what and how the reaction was altered.

Although psychology became histological there gradually developed an attitude of distrust that the determination of the elements is the principal method of understanding what the mental processes are. To analogize again, it seemed impossible to make up mental water by bringing together two atoms of mental hydrogen and one atom of mental oxygen, just as in the world of the chemist water is not made simply by the mixture of hydrogen and oxygen. Moreover, there also developed the views that the mental states had relations one to another, and that individuals were not mentally made up of the same number of elements but of different quantities and combinations of them. Because of these criticisms, overt or implied, a functional psychology arose. In functional psychology interrelations were stressed, and mental activities were discussed in place of mental states. Development or sequences also became important. The becoming and the became were looked upon as of greater importance than that which was changed.

As we look at matters to-day it is not surprising that emphasis should have been placed on the observation of children, of races, and of animals. And when children, primitive peoples, and animals were looked upon as psychological materials, it is not surprising that at least as a working hypothesis there was an acceptance of the philosophical view of the equivalence of the mental and the physical, especially the neurological. This was

the seven-league step of objective psychology. But that step was not taken for the benefit of any philosophy. The step was made possible only because of the use of philosophical boots.

The application of the principle of parsimony to the consideration of animal and child mentalities was another philosophical step, although with obvious scientific approval. It was the use of a materialistic, or realistic, philosophical crutch. It did not help the philosopher to advance his progress. It borrowed a philosophical support for psychological progress. And the farther advance of behaviorism was assisted by a more extensive borrowing of philosophical splints and bandages as well as of a philosophical crutch. Behaviorism has brought forward a totality of reactions as the only possible scientific explanation of mentality. It has discarded the search for a reaction, it has sought a kind of energy relationship between some changes in the objective world (stimuli) and other changes in the objective world (activities of muscles, glands, etc.). It is, therefore, allied to the energy philosophy which is an aspect of materialism.

On the other hand and seemingly opposed to behaviorism is the Gestalt kind of psychology. The term Gestalt has been variously translated as "form," "constellation," "configuration," "pattern," and "situation." Its fundamental tenets may be illustrated by one of the early examples which was set forth to show its standpoint and its differences from other kinds of psychology. Suppose, for instance, one has presented to him for inspection four lines of equal length. Although physically four times one, psychologically they may be quite different. They may be combined in different ways. If the lines are arranged vertically in order, they have one effect upon us. Arranged horizontally and contiguously, they have a second effect, and when arranged contiguously to make what we call a square, they have a third effect. The pattern, or situation, or the Gestalt, is the determining factor towards the production of an effect which the four stimuli make upon us. So also with other stimuli. They have effect (in the production of reactions, one must keep

in mind) not only because of their quantity but also because of the combinations. This is the main contribution of the Gestalt psychology. There is here no answer to a philosophical question, it is a simple statement of a psychological fact: different combinations of the same stimuli may give rise to different reactions or mental states.

Philosophical friends of the Gestalt psychologists and some of the Gestalters who are philosophically minded have emphasized the implication of the qualities in what we perceive, but I fail to see in that a contribution to a philosophical interpretation of the world. The idea in the Gestalt is sensationalistic. There is a reference, however, not to a presentation which is divided microscopically, but to a presentation of many materials in a mass and all together in a coherent whole. Here we have what I would call a functional sensationalism. A reaction, whether simple or complex, is not due to a stimulus, but it is due to a constellation of what we may analyze as many individual stimuli. This is a return to a primitive unanalytic psychology, but it is coupled with the appreciation that the complexes may be analyzed, logically or scientifically, if one cares to do so. It is, however, a reversion to the days when complex stimuli were considered to be simple. The Gestalters recognize that the stimuli are complex, but they also believe that the many combine into a whole which acts as a stimulus. And this gives us a more accurate understanding of what we react to.

Behaviorism and Gestalt psychology are reactions away from philosophical-psychological atomism, and both have developed from psychological functionalism. One is complementary to the other. One deals in the main with the stimulus—the precursor of the reaction; the other deals mainly with the reaction—the sequence to the stimulus. In neither is there to be found an answer to those questions which are asked by and answered by philosophers. Both are built upon philosophical foundations in the same fashion as other sciences are being builded.

There may be psychologists who reject my formulation of the current psychologies as being too simple, and consequently

too inaccurate. They may recognize differences as fundamental which I have not here presented. They have wares to sell, and they may wish to advertise them as the purest and the most wholesome, the strongest and the most artistic, to be obtained in all sizes and in all shapes to suit the individual purchaser.

There may also be those who reject my formulation of the problems of philosophers, who look rather upon the philosophical problem as that of a *Weltanschauung*, in the sense of Herbert Spencer, and who would deny that there is anything made which cannot be fitted into their homes. To them let me say that if they care to build their homes from the materials of behaviorism and Gestalt psychology, those goods may be found on the market. They need no psychological salesman to display his wares. As builders they should know the value of materials they use. They have the world's goods from which to select. If they choose to make a philosophical fireplace of behavioristic bricks, and if they choose to use Gestalt glass to let in philosophical sunlight, they may do so. If they believe that behavioristic glass lets in more philosophical light, and that Gestalt bricks will make a warmer philosophical fireplace, such combinations may attract some visitors. It ill behooves psychologists to advise the philosophical architect how to construct his own home. It is certain that psychologists are not contributing the materials for the building, and it is equally certain they are not operating exclusive shops for philosophers.

APRIL

ANNICE CALLAND

The wonder of the spring is mine forever.
The world is ugly if I find it so;
For past the gates of toil and vain endeavor—
Like Botticelli springtimes long ago—
There lies a land of high green hills I know
And noises of the sea and gulls in flight
Across the shining bars and breakers white.

A RACE AGAINST TIME

BY GLENDOLIN DAMON WAGNER

Katherine Mansfield gave to the world a quivering happiness straight from her own enraptured soul. Her genius led her far away from the beaten paths of short-story writers, prompting her to blaze new trails; so new—so venturesome—that cautious publishers and editors hesitated to follow. Like all trail-blazers she went alone, over a way that was rough underfoot, with darkness about her. Yet she was not afraid. For she saw, far ahead, a light invisible to others, and she moved bravely on towards it. She was sure of herself. Shaking free of the fetters of the formula-bound story, she dramatized moments; captured beauty with words; ran a breathless race with Death, winning by a stride.

Born in 1888, she died in January of 1923, encompassing, in that brief time, all that the human mind can possibly conceive of the intensity of living—the height of joy, the height of grief, and the height of love. Beautiful as are her stories, more beautiful still is the life of the girl, the wife, the genius. The aspects of her life are threefold: the story of the wife's love for her husband; the story of the artist's buoyant snatching at great handfuls of life; and the sublime story of the soul's triumphant struggle against the encroaching horror of the disease and death forever menacing.

In her attitude toward her husband, J. Middleton Murray, she is a woman—whimsical, exacting, hungry; giving and giving of herself, tenderly, generously. Her life-long, unanswered prayer was for a home. She who spent most of her married life alone in strange hotel rooms, in her determined pursuit of health, wanted "just such a little home, with books and music, a garden, children, as woman has the right to expect."

In her journal she says: "If I had a home, and could pull the curtains together, lock the door—walk around my own, perfect room, soundlessly, watching the lights and shadows—."

Only a few days later she writes, with a courage unparalleled: "I have consumption. But I do not care. I do not want anything

I could not have. Peace, solitude, time to write my books, beautiful external life to watch and ponder—no more. O, I'd like a child as well—a baby boy." And then, in French: "But I demand too much."

The relationship between Katherine Mansfield and her husband must, normally, have been exquisite. With their highly sensitized minds, ardently alert to the beauties of life, they must have been exceptionally companionable. But five years of invalidism, in which she wandered to Paris, Germany, Switzerland, England, and back to Paris, alone, seemed to her, no doubt mistakenly, to have created in him—not indifference, but a sort of suspension of love, that youthful, demanding, zestful love of their early days, and replaced it by a patient waiting for her recovery.

There came to be a spiritual separation between the two. In her journal she says: "What remains of all those years together? If they were so important how could they have come to nothing? Who gave up, and why?" And a page farther on: "Fear? Fear of what? Doesn't it come down to fear of losing J.? I believe it does. But, good heavens! Face things. What have you of him now? He talks to you—sometimes. And then goes off. He thinks of you tenderly. He dreams of a life with you—some day—when the miracle has happened . . . Yet there is a deep, tender flood of feeling in my heart which is love for him and longing for him. Life together, with me ill, is simply torture, with happy moments, but—it's not life."

Almost the last words she ever wrote were: "What do I want? Warm, eager, living life—to be rooted in life—to learn, to desire, to know, to feel, to think, to act. That is what I want, nothing less. That is what I must try for."

With Death lurking, ever, just ahead, casting black shadows over the path, no one could have lived more eagerly, joyously, bravely, than she. One day she wrote, with pathetic significance: "I chased the fowls. One brown fowl refused to leave the garden. Long after it knew there was no gap in the wire netting it kept running up and down. I must not forget that." For her,

also, there was no gap in the netting, no release from the trap of Death.

After the death of her dearly beloved brother, who lost his life in the World War, she said: "Brother, I think I have known for a long time that life is over for me. Yes, though he is lying in the middle of a little wood in France, and I am still upright, and feeling the sun and the wind and the sea, I am just as much dead as he."

In a sense her words were untrue, for no one could be more vitally alive than she, up to the last moment of her life. Her personality is vivid, like a scarlet flower in a dingy room; like the thin, shrill, high sweetness of a violin note, tremulous, throbbing, wailing, calling, calling. She did live more truly than most. She did drink more deeply of the wine of life—its sparkle, its tonic sharpness, and its sediments and dregs.

She wrote: "Oh, Life! Accept me—make me worthy—teach me. I write that. I look up. The leaves move in the garden, the sky is pale, and I catch myself weeping. It is hard—it is hard to make a good death—

"To live—to live—that is all—."

"June. Switzerland. —As to *fear*—it is gone. It is replaced by a callousness. What will be, will be."

This attitude of assumed callousness lasted only a little time, was only an interlude along the heights toward which she was climbing. Many times, because she loved life and was loath to give it up, she wavered and faltered. A child reaching out eager arms toward the brightness; so her avid mind reaching out toward the world of people and things. As yet there were, for her, so many mysteries unsolved; so many beauties undiscovered. Like a child she was reluctant to leave the gayety of the party, and go home, alone, in the dark, while other guests were still having such a wonderful time.

Very definitely was fixed the time limit of her short life. There were moments of shrinking horror; periods of grim determination to fight; hours of listless abandon to the decree. But those periods were short; could not dim the brightness of

her joy in the present. An abounding radiance permeated her being. She was saturated with joy. Her whole life was rich and vital with the intensity of living. Almost every moment was pregnant with emotional values. A bare tree with a fluttering leaf or two; sunrise of a winter morning; stone steps bathed in moonlight; from such things did she derive fuel for the sheer ecstasy which burned within her. But only she can express that rapture in adequate words: "Blue sky. Blue mountains. All is a heavenly blueness. And clouds of all kinds—wings; soft, white clouds; almost hard, little, golden clouds—great mock mountains. The gold deepens on the slope. In fact—in sober fact—it is perfection. But the late evening is the time of times. Then, with that unearthly beauty before me it is not hard to realize how far one has to go. To write something that will be worthy of that rising moon—that pale light. To be simple enough, as one would be simple with God."

With deepest reverence we read: "The heavens opened for the sunset tonight. When I had thought the day folded and sealed came a burst of heavenly bright petals. I sat behind the window, pricked with rain, and looked until that hard thing in my breast melted and broke into the smallest fountain, and I drank the sky and the whisper."

Another picture, and behind the whiteness of the word picture she paints shines the white soul of Katherine Mansfield: "The forlorn wind scarcely breathes. I love to close my eyes a minute and think of the land outside, white under the mingled snow and moonlight—the heaps of stones by the roadside—white—snow in the furrows. How quiet and how patient!"

Driven by her desperate urge to live she had gone here and gone there, tried this sanitarium and that, visited doctors, until, eventually, she found one brave enough to tell her the truth: that, for her, there was no hope. Upon her return to her room after that momentous decision she wrote: "And, yet, one has these glimpses before which all that one has ever written—all that one has ever read—pales. The waves, as I drove home, this afternoon, and the high foam—how it was suspended in

the air before it fell! What is it that happens in that moment of suspension? It is timeless. In that moment the whole of the soul is contained. One is flung up—out of life—one is held—and then—down, bright, broken, glittering, onto the rocks, tossed back, part of the ebb.”

The woman, alone, facing the inexorable nearness of death, writing: “Shall one ever be at peace with oneself? Ever quiet and uninterrupted—without pain—with the one whom one loves under the same roof? Is it too much to ask?”

But this same woman, whose youthful gayety could not be suppressed for long, even by the dark menace ever lurking near, met life, for the most part, with a sparkling, courageous humor, and dared to laugh. Following her first serious hemorrhage, she wrote:

Almighty Father of all, and most celestial giver,
Who has granted to us Thy children a heart and lungs and
liver,

If upon me should descend Thy beautiful gift of tongues,
Incline not Thine Omnipotent Ear to my remarks on
lungs.

So intertwined with her wifely love and her religion was her love for her work that the three cannot be separated. Her work seemed to her a vastly important thing—a divine mission. Often she prayed that she might be so cleansed and purified that she be found worthy to do the thing God had meant her to do. And her days—almost her hours—were numbered. Each day slipping away past her brought her nearer the end she dreaded and feared. It was a mad, breathless, frantic race she was running, against Time.

She poured out her longing in her journal, thus: “I really ask only time to write it all—time to write my books; then I won’t mind dying. I live to write. The lovely world (Oh, God, how lovely the external world is) is there, and I bathe in it, and am refreshed. But I feel as though I had a duty. Someone has set me a task which I am bound to finish. Let me finish it without hurrying—leaving all as fair as I can. Shall I be able, one

day, to express my love of work—my desire to be a better writer—my longing to take better pains? And the passion I feel—it is my religion. Of people—I create my people; of life—it is life. The temptation is to kneel before it, adore it, to prostrate myself, to stay too long in a state of ecstasy before the *idea* of it. I must be more about my Master's business."

Is it any wonder that the editors were bewildered and hesitant when genius was offered them in this whirlwind of divine passion, and that they, at first, failed to recognize the purity of the gold, because the wrappings were new? Katherine Mansfield loved to write. Maupassant, to whom she has been compared, hated his work even while he obeyed an urge stronger than himself. He felt irate toward the whole universe. She loved all things created by God. Both opened the human heart and peered deep within it. There he found ugliness; she, beauty.

We pause to marvel what she might have given us, this breathless creature of spiritual fire, had death not snatched her so soon. Chekhov has said: "The beauty of the bird's song is not measured by its length." Perhaps, after all, she did her Master's work, and perhaps she was taken because it was finished. Valiantly she fought against illness; against losing her husband in death; against her awful fear of death. Fought and won, for her last supreme struggle with Self, and with Fear, reaches a climax of victory.

Entering her own, peculiar Gethsemane she emerged, finally, serene, triumphant, unafraid. Her last written words were: "All this sounds very serious. But now that I have wrestled with it, it is no longer so. I feel happy—deep down. *All is well.*"

CURRENT THOUGHT

Vision and Technique in Philosophy

An article with this title by Morris R. Cohen in the *Philosophical Review* for March, is a significant declaration of faith by one of the great teachers of philosophy in the United States. Containing, as it does, important suggestions for the study and teaching of the various philosophic disciplines, the article has an interest both timely and permanent. Emphasis is placed upon mastery of systematic logic and the rigorous method in general as the essential presupposition of the development of worthy philosophical vision.

In the history of philosophy adequate attention to technique would mean, according to the author, the return to original sources for material. The same strictly critical standards that apply in history generally should be employed in the history of philosophy.

Following his largely unexceptionable discussion of what procedure should be in the history of philosophy, Professor Cohen considers logic and metaphysics. They should, he says, be closely connected. The logical order of science is generally the objective order disclosed by any theoretical study of the subject-matter of the science itself, and so is "characteristic of the world studied." Logic is thus a part of metaphysics. Indeed, the two polar regions to be explored by metaphysical research, namely, the elements on one hand and the whole of things on the other, are to be mapped out less by study of empirical facts or laws than by rigid application of the dialectical method. The only alternative to such thoroughness is declared to be a "one-sided conceptual impressionism" in metaphysics.

And ethics, says Professor Cohen, demands not only zeal for moral and ethical issues, but a still greater zeal for impartial consideration of the logical consequences of such issues.

Finally, he describes logic as an extension of the actual and so as a liberalizer of historical theory. This study of possibilities in the philosophy of history releases man from the worship of actuality involved in the evolutionary-progressive view and is one of the important factors in keeping vision alive in the world.

Professor Cohen perhaps takes his cue too strongly from the sciences, to the exclusion of other legitimate approaches to philosophy, with a consequent over-emphasis upon formal and symbolic logic. It would seem quite possible to accept most of his theses without going over to that identification of logic with the technique of philosophy which he seems to suggest.

The relation, for example, between mastery of method and resultant insights into the nature of reality is inseparable in all the sciences, and it is good to have the same truth brought home for philosophy. But the relation between solid technique and current fashions in logic remains difficult to define.

CARL FARMAN.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

Lost Rivers

By this title I do not refer to those streams which like the famous Lost River of the New England mountains loses itself from human sight under the debris of glacial rocks. More akin is it to that river which comforted the climbing pilgrim up the slopes of Purgatory, since he could hear far off its refreshing murmur. This river Dante describes as springing of itself quite independent of melting snows or falling rains. Such a river as this is my theme and whoever my reader may be it is certain that such a river flows ever with rhythmic song through the meadows of blessed memory. A friend writes, "I shall never forget you and the last day of fishing in our canoes above Milton." O day of youth and unforgettable joy! Having had this river in experience it can no more be lost.

There it lies forever charmed and charming. After the long years the sun dances still upon its ripples, the song of its cataracts brings rest to the heart, its sweeping bends, and stately pools and tumultuous rapids wield an immortal power over those who in far-off days idled and toiled beside it. That is not a "lost" river beside which my feet may likely never stray again. I still have my Rossignol, my Grand, my Looking Glass, my Vaucluse where Petrarch walked before me. Whether it be the little rushing river at Lourdes, or the Bouze in Burgundy or the lordly Rhine or the busy Merrimac, the wild Pemigewasset or the sedate Connecticut or my own alluring and musical San Gabriel. Once having them, I can nevermore be deprived of them. To have lost a river means not to be removed from it but rather only that I have never seen it. Here as in all other things I am rich by what I possess and its deepest treasure cannot be taken from me.

This is the reason for the never flagging zeal of the rocking chair fleet with its score of faded eyed sea dogs, and the groups of inglenook fishermen who fare no more forth, and the golfers who gather themselves at the nineteenth hole. All hail, brother sportsman and kin of my heart! They speak amiss who say that the greatest of pleasure is in anticipation. There is the sweeter joy of retrospection in which one is not burdened with ambition, nor racked by care of the outcome whether of full creel, or stormy seas, or attempted score. All that has been mine comes back to cheer me. Voices long lost by time and distance or stilled until the eternal morning live with me once more in a memory that is ever fair and unclouded.

R. T. F.

Along the Bookshelf

Metaphysics

HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF LOGIC, translated by W. H. JOHNSTON and L. G. STRUTHERS. Volume I: Objective Logic—pp. 404; Volume II: Subjective Logic—pp. 486. The Macmillan Company, N. Y. 1929. \$10.00.

NEW VIEWS OF EVOLUTION, by G. P. CONGER. The Macmillan Company, San Francisco. 1929. Pp. 235. \$2.50.

MODERN MATERIALISM AND EMERGENT EVOLUTION, by WILLIAM McDUGALL. D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., New York. 1929. Pp. 249. \$2.75.

TYPES OF PHILOSOPHY, by WILLIAM ERNEST HOCKING. Charles Scribner's Sons, N. Y. 1929. Pp. 462.

PHILOSOPHY BY WAY OF THE SCIENCES, by RAY H. DOTTERER. The Macmillan Co., N. Y. 1929. Pp. 469. \$2.50.

There are two works of Hegel which may in a special meaning be denominated *opera magna*, the *Phaenomenologie des Geistes* and the *Wissenschaft der Logik*. The first of these, translated into English by J. B. Baillie, was published by Professor Muirhead in his "Library of Philosophy" in 1910 and the present translation of the *Science of Logic* is now published under the same auspices. Each of these works was designed by Hegel to present the complete system of philosophy. Each contains the whole Hegelian theory and was so intended. The earlier of the two he was accustomed to describe as his voyage of discovery, the later is his mature work. In the *Science of Logic* we have the system of the real, presented with that mighty force and superb confidence which amazed the philosophic world a hundred years ago, and which amazes us today after a century of scientific achievement has changed the face of the civilized world and altered the whole human outlook.

There were two other important works of Hegel which were published during his lifetime, the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* and a much shorter course of lectures on *Philosophy of Law*. There is an English translation of the latter by Dr. Dyde, now difficult to obtain, and considerable portions of the *Encyclopaedia* were translated by the late Professor William Wallace and are probably the most familiar of all the translations to English students. Hegel's other numerous writings, occupying twelve of the eighteen volumes of his collected works, were published posthumously and consist of his notes for the courses of lectures delivered in his classroom.

J. E. McTaggart in his excellent *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic* was the first modern expounder of Hegel to insist on the importance of taking the system as a whole. It is impossible to select from Hegel, to take some part and discard the rest, for the essence of the whole system

is the logical concatenation, and a serious weakness or fatal flaw in any essential link of the chain must be fatal to the whole reasoning. The translators of the present work were both, we believe, students of McTaggart's, and though their work is translation not criticism we may see the spirit of the master in the zealous care they have devoted to the work. It is a great accomplishment, and one for which students of philosophy of every school must be grateful.

Logic for Hegel is the whole of philosophy. Yet he is not a logician in the accepted meaning of the term. His logic is a metaphysics. It is the science of the logos, and the logos is reason manifesting itself as the universal activity. It is in this sense that the real is the rational and the rational the real.

Of all the great philosophers Hegel is the easiest to misunderstand. The reason is that it is impossible to understand Hegel by reading about his philosophy, the philosophy must be read. It is only for those who try to discover a short cut to his theory that there is a "secret" of Hegel. This is a hard saying, for Hegel's shortest book is long, his argument is sustained at a steady even level, his thinking is unrelieved by any flashes of sudden illumination, he never for a moment slackens his hold or loosens his grip on the work he is doing. It is vain to protest, he must be read or left alone. It seems unreasonable, particularly in the modern world, that philosophy "whose value is above rubies," should entail this slave work. What is the use of philosophy if it is not to uplift us after the day's drudgery is done, to inspire us with the glimpse of higher values? It is not true to say that Hegel denies us this inspiration, but it is true to say that this is not his philosophy.

The popular idea of Hegel is that he begins with the simplest pure concept, "being," identifies it with its negation, "nothing," then proceeds to show the dialectical movement by which being passes into nothing and nothing passes into being in the concept of becoming, and that this is the beginning of a "dance of bloodless categories" which enchains the whole realms of nature and mind. What Hegel really demonstrates is that however bare and simple the concept with which we start, if we yield to the reason which is working actively in our thought, we shall find no resting-place until we have reached the "notion," that is, the concrete universal concept which comprehends within itself all reality in its rationality. It is not: See how the simple leads to the complex; it is: See how the simplest real thought implies the whole of actuality.

There are of course lofty flights of fancy in Hegel as well as profound depths of insight which anyone may appreciate. Also in the observations which he intersperses in the general text there are occasionally brilliant illustrations, but the real Hegel is not to be understood by snippets. As Lord Haldane wrote in his introduction to this translation: "He was a hard, dry man."

Is then a translation worth while? There need be no hesitation in the answer. If there be any value in philosophy, if we want philoso-

phers, not of this school or of that, but philosophers who philosophize, then it may be doubted if in the whole realm of philosophical literature there is any work better calculated to train men to the philosophic task than this. For universities and schools of philosophy it is not a work of reference to be put on the library shelf; it is a work to be diligently studied in the Seminar.

A compositor's transposition of "Form" into "From" (Vol. II, p. 143) may be troublesome to the reader. Hegel sometimes puts such special meaning into prepositions that the mistake is not immediately obvious, more especially as the right word is not suggested by the context. It speaks highly for the careful revision that this is the only troublesome misprint we have observed.

H. WILDON CARR.

New Views of Evolution is a volume in the Philosophy for the Layman Series, and is evidently intended to stem the tide of fundamentalist obscurantism. Its fairmindedness in admitting the gaps in the proofs of evolutionism, its almost meticulous abstention from any expression of contempt for anti-evolutionist interpretations, and the clearness and simplicity of its style are skillful adaptations to this purpose. Only two criticisms seem called for. The first is that Professor Conger conceives "evolution" very widely, and perhaps one should add, rather vaguely. He is far from confining himself to the problems of biological history, and it would almost be true to say that all is "evolution" that comes into his net. He justifies himself by propounding three criteria of "evolution," viz.: (1) process or change in time, (2) serial arrangement, and (3) immanent or inherent causation. He includes both "integrations" and "differentiations" in the evolutionary process, and admits that the latter are not always easy to distinguish from disintegrations, but is not quite clear about the place of "creative synthesis" (p. 24). However he clearly abstains from the common error of claiming that "evolution" implies *progress*; neither does he mention that in popular conception it has usurped the meaning which was originally attached to "epigenesis."

Now it may be doubted whether these three criteria are enough to constitute an "evolution." The first plainly fails to distinguish it from any course of events, the second may be only a subjective convenience read into nature by us and can only rarely be established historically, the third cannot be rendered distinctive because even the most "external" causation conceivable is only relatively so, and "creative synthesis" is only an obscure phrase which slurs over the essential question of whether (and how) the course of nature is capable of generating genuine *novelties*. The whole contains no reply to the suggestion that evolutionism may be only an attempt by us to read the course of nature as a significant, unitary process, in spite of a multitude of facts that fail to conform to this interpretation. And this suggestion leads on to a second criticism. Ought not Professor Conger to have at least mentioned that the course of events in several ways lends itself to the interpretation that it is really the *resultant* of two opposed tendencies? Many of the admitted facts seem

to indicate that the *physical* world is running down, whereas in the *psychical* realm the dominant tendencies are (on the whole) progressive. This *dualistic* interpretation is clearly inconsistent with evolutionism, but it can hardly be declared inconsistent with the facts; and it would by no means lead to a less interesting view of life.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

The dilemma into which the controversy between the mechanists and the vitalists has plunged us appears in Dr. McDougall's latest book. The vitalist argues for the necessity of special categories, such as purpose and vital impulse, to account for the facts. But the mechanist contends that such categories make the primary aims of science, predictability and control of behavior, impossible of attainment, and with veritable scorn he holds that any procedure which departs from the assumption of strict mechanical causality ceases to be scientific. Even though he may be somewhat disturbed by the turn in physics toward indeterminism, he rests his case upon the fruitfulness of the mechanistic hypothesis. The vitalist returns with the charge that this is an abstract and artificial limitation of scientific method which refuses to consider the primary datum of experience, the mind, and its most significant contents. It seems that science must either surrender the ideal of strict determinism, or recognize the artificial nature of its method and the necessity of the higher activity of thought in philosophy to explain experience.

Professor McDougall's challenge to contemporary naturalisms in his recent *Modern Materialism and Emergent Evolution* not only justifies the dilemma but lays firm hold of the first horn as a solution. The first half of the book is a series of lectures delivered as Duncan Lecturer at the Louisville Presbyterian Seminary. An equal number of pages in finer print are filled with a series of essays dealing with the views of many current thinkers, and are especially valuable to the critical student.

The title of the book at first glance naturally reminds one of the reprehensible tendency to call bad names, which is not uncommon in social and religious fields. To fasten the name of *materialism* upon any system, serves, for many religious minds, in lieu of any further thought upon the problems involved. But Mr. McDougall is not to be charged with superficiality in his treatment. He makes good his charge by showing that, although the older atomic materialism has largely passed off the stage, yet the mechanistic scheme of things involved in atomism has survived in a wide variety of systems. Then he presents in brief form with important additions, the argument for the teleological nature of all behavior, which is familiar to students of McDougall's works. As one of the eminent psychologists who have interested themselves in psychical research, he is convinced that the evidence for telepathy is sufficiently strong to indicate the non-spatial nature of the mental structure, and with John Dewey he holds that the question of the survival of personality should be made the subject of empirical investigation as a matter of fact. There can be no objection to such investigation, so long as it

is not made the ground of arbitrary rejection of the force of philosophical arguments, a thing which Mr. McDougall does not do.

The chief interest of the volume for current thought centers in the criticism of Gestalt theory and Emergent Evolution. It is a frontal attack, and one that the proponents of the new evolutionism will have to face. *Emergence* and *Gestalt* are new words for what has long been known as creative synthesis. On the basis of the slim analogy between chemical synthesis and mental synthesis and without due regard for the radical difference between them, the two are merged under one notion of emergence in what Professor McDougall regards as a hybrid system between the mutually incompatible positions of mechanism and teleology.

The force of this criticism centers in the distinction between the notion of matter and the notion of life. It is not, perhaps, wrong to say that life is an emergent which could not be predicted from atomic processes; but it does not go deep enough. The word Evolution means quite a different thing in the physical realm and in the organic realm. Indeed there is serious doubt if the word is appropriate at all for the bare change of the physical world whose direction is downward toward thermodynamic equilibrium. But in the organic realm a new kind of energy emerges which cuts across the primeval cosmic energy on the crust of this cooling and running-down planet. This new energy is working in the opposite direction, and the essential nature of its activity is purpose. It is entirely meaningless apart from the history and memory of the organism and the anticipatory direction of its activity. The only genuinely unpredictable emergents, the author argues, are to be found in the mental synthesis, and he holds that the emergent in chemical synthesis is predictable. His argument at this point is not entirely convincing by comparison with that of Lloyd Morgan. We must await the verdict of the chemist.

In regard to the emergence of mind, Mr. McDougall's criticism is directed toward the theory of Lloyd Morgan. This view holds that mind emerges by steps, first as sentience, and then as cognition or objective reference. The problem of the emergence of conation and affective consciousness is wholly neglected, and McDougall therefore regards the system as a re-emergence of the old discredited sensationalism and epiphenomenalism. He has no serious objection however to those theories which take due concern for the emergence of purposive causality in life and mind. He quotes Mr. Hobhouse as representative of such a view. It is of special interest in this connection to note that Mr. Lloyd Morgan, in a contribution to *Hibbert Journal*, entitled "Emergence and Freedom," which appeared simultaneously with this book (July, 1929), seems to make some concessions to the point of view demanded by Mr. McDougall. He claims for the principle of emergence merely a descriptive explanation "in terms of relatedness physical and mental, *after it* (the emergent) *has come.*" He aims to clear his system of determinism by affirmation of the unpredictability of the emergent. Then when he faces the question of efficient causality he posits both a Divine Agency and human freedom.

None of the systems under review, including that of Mr. McDougall, gives sufficient consideration to the uniqueness of self-consciousness as distinguished from life. The importance which Mr. McDougall assigns to conation enables him to assimilate too easily this most unique and crowning factor in evolution to the general organic processes. The scientific demand for objectivity cannot call the philosopher away from what must be first and last his chief problem, the understanding of that which makes man a man. Purposive activity is not it. The lowest animals share this if we are able to believe Professor McDougall. But the reflective, self-consciousness is the differentia. Emergents there are, perhaps in such ubiquity as to rob them of special significance; but at two levels, where life is distinguished from matter, and where self-consciousness is distinguished from life, whether we call them emergents or not, the word is wholly inadequate for purposes of explanation.

ALBION R. KING.

Nothing is more interesting than to study the various ways in which teachers of philosophy lead their pupils into the dry and hard courses which they know are ahead of them. Professor Hocking's method in *Types of Philosophy* is gentleness itself. He shows them first the kind of interest philosophy has and the sort of questions it asks. Then in the manner of the general knowledge books of our grandparents' generation, which portrayed the various races of man with their strange but picturesque manners and customs, he gives them types of philosophy. All are equally lovable and each in some way specially commendable. There is certainly variety enough yet we feel it could not have been attractiveness of this kind which drew Socrates, Spinoza and Hegel into the philosophic path. We have to recollect, however, that the young people today who take philosophy want credits.

H. W. C.

There are many ways to approach philosophy for the student today, including ethics, religion, history, logic and the sciences. The author of a popular book in logic, Professor R. H. Dotterer, has now given us, in *Philosophy by Way of the Sciences*, an introduction that will be welcomed by many. The sciences which he surveys are astronomy, geology, physical geography, physics, chemistry, mathematics, biology and psychology. He gives first the significant results and then the perplexities which require philosophic treatment. Every major in these sciences ought to be required to read such a volume as an antidote to scientific dogmatism, and every student of philosophy should appreciate such a careful and readable survey of results and problems in these fields.

The second section undertakes the construction of a philosophy based on these sciences which will provide a place for human ideals in a universe of scientific reals. The rigid mechanism prescribed by science is modified by an "emergent mechanism" in which "human" purposes are given a real and efficient, if subordinate, status. "Cosmic teleology" is rejected "as long as we retain the point of view of the sciences and decline

to have our thinking determined by external authority." Furthermore it makes God responsible for evil. It is difficult to see how that situation is helped by ascribing evil "to the refractoriness of matter." God is saved by defining him as the Good-Will and restricting him to a partial immanence in the emerged realm of human values. But God does not seem to have for Professor Dotterer, as for Professor Alexander and Professor Whitehead, the first place in the emerging series. He must, himself, be an emergent. Religion cannot be defined as the feeling of dependence, because men are really more dependent on matter than on God. Religion is enthusiasm for the good. The solution of the conflict between religion and science is to be found in a common devotion to truth as revealed in science and goodness in human endeavor.

In it all, the author achieves the very difficult task of constructing a system of melioristic progress through the use of the magic word "emergent." Just "how" we are to conceive that life emerges from matter or conscious values from life we are not informed. Human purposes and values are granted a real place in the progressing universe, but Professor Dotterer does not seem to have the same respect for the social sciences that he has for the physical sciences.

A. R. K.

The Problem of Value

THE IDEA OF VALUE, by JOHN LAIRD. The Macmillan Company, N. Y. 1929. Pp. 384. 18s. net.

THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD — METAPHYSICS AND VALUE, by WILBUR MARSHALL URBAN. The Macmillan Company, N. Y. 1929. Pp. 479.

During the past three decades an enormous literature has appeared on the subject of Value. The outcome of this new emphasis in the field of philosophy is a fortunate one. The substitution of the term Value for the Good, with its narrower connotation, is symptomatic of a general movement in thought toward a "thickening up" of the categories, on the one hand, and a breakdown in the rigid distinction between intellect and appreciation, "pure" reason and "practical" reason on the other. As Professor Urban puts it, the new orientation in value releases us "from all those inhibitions which arise from narrow and *ex-parte* definitions of reality and truth, and thus sets free the deeper initiatives of the soul."

Two significant books in this field have appeared during the past year. *The Idea of Value*, by Professor Laird of Aberdeen University, is a scholarly account, both historical and critical, of the definition of Value. Its contents are aptly summarized in the advertisement on the cover as an attempt "to examine the conceptions of value, goodness and excellence, particular aesthetic, economic and moral values, with special reference to the opinions of philosophers upon this matter from Thomas Hobbes to the present day; and it contains a chapter upon the measurement of value."

In his able review of value theories in modern thought the writer dis-

covers three competing doctrines of value which he names respectively the elective, the appreciative and the timological; in other words, theories of natural election, of psychological interest, and of conceptual worth or excellence. The *elective* view, in his own words, "rests on the simple foundation that whatever *matters* to a thing, or concerns it, is a value or disvalue to that thing; and whatever does not matter to it, is, for it, no value but wholly indifferent. Since everything matters to itself, self-maintenance is a value to every existent." Whitehead may be named as a representative of this extraordinary theory. The *appreciative* or psychological view asserts that "our feelings and conscious interests are all that matter to us, and nothing can matter to a being that does not feel." The *timological* theory regards objects of prizing or esteem as having an axiological or objective status and cognitively apprehended. In the last analysis, it is suggested, the appreciative view is an unstable combination which logically resolves itself into either the elective or the timological view. It easily reduces to the former, since it relies on interest as the essential component, and interest is a mere factual condition with respect to one kind of existent, the psychological. The appealing power of the appreciative view, on the other hand, is due to an implicit incorporation of an objective or normative standard of appreciation; its convincing appeal is due to its timology. The author puts the matter thus:

Therefore, of two things, one. Either appreciation is only a special form of elective prizing, or it is something so much more *excellent* than unfelt elective prizing that the latter is not worth calling "prizing" at all. The latter alternative is pure timology, and the timology in it is not otiose. The former alternative would forbid the belief that any election is better than any other, that the elections of a clod are either more or less worthy than the elections of a man . . . The appreciative view, we have argued, itself could not stand without somewhere presupposing objective timology. The nature of this timology, of course, is not thereby defined. But we found when we considered these attempts to make feeling potentially objective that they could not succeed, and that the objectivity of values requires the *truth* of value-judgment, if it is known at all.

The author elsewhere states that he believes that "there must be a certain affinity or natural propinquity between objective values and the human soul"; there are "close connections between our sentiments and appreciations, on the one hand, and our insight into excellence upon the other." What he does not suggest, however, is the possibility that insight into excellence involves a unique synthesis of sentiment, on the one hand, and judgment, on the other. *Would* there be any appreciation of valid excellences by a being who lacked *either* feeling or intellect?

Drollery blends pleasantly with close logic in this important book. It is a piece of broad and thorough scholarship, valuable both as an historical survey of the concept of value in the modern period, and as an able defense of a position which has quite unjustifiably lost some ground in

America in recent years. The inclusion of chapters on economic value and value-measurement will be found of interest.

The Intelligible World, by Professor Urban of Dartmouth College, is a serious and important piece of sustained philosophy and a direct contribution to the problem of Value. Its problem is accurately indicated in its subtitle as the relation of Value to Metaphysics which, as the author states, "is the key-problem of our age." The central thesis of the book contends that there has been a *philosophia perennis*, the Great Tradition in thought, which is at once the natural metaphysics of the human mind and the authentic point of view. The Great Tradition, the essential spirit of European thought from its inception, furthermore, has always and deliberately held faith in "the inseparability of the highest value from the most truly real." "The assumption of this unity, or in more philosophical terms, of the inseparability of value and reality, is the driving force of the natural metaphysic of the human mind." It is in defense of this major tradition, and against "philosophical modernism" which repudiates this position, that the author writes. He is convinced that the recent revolt in philosophy in which the dignity and integrity of the mind as a whole is attacked, and wisdom replaced by scientific method and scientific categories, is in the direction of essential unintelligibility. It should be noted that *philosophia perennis* involves no particular solution of the debate between realism and idealism, although at the present time the Great Tradition is being defended primarily by the latter. "My own belief," the writer declares, "is that the great philosophers have, in an important sense, always been above the battle." The fundamental point to be asserted is that "When the barriers of the sects have fallen there remains a *philosophia perennis* which is not so much a conscious construction of the pure intellect of the individual as the inevitable expression of the typical spirituality of the human soul."

The epistemological background of the author's metaphysical deduction, with which the book is primarily concerned, is well-known through his previous work on *Valuation*, which follows the way laid out by Windelband, Rickert and Münsterberg. Mind is value-centric, and value involves acknowledgment, recognition of universal validities. Thus Value is a more fundamental category than Being, and all philosophy must be oriented with respect to this fact. The author's contention is impregnable that in some sense of the word, Value is the ultimate category in philosophy. The prejudice toward value is inescapable. The history of thought indicates what introspection will demonstrate, namely, that the search for Reality involves a demand, a claim upon our intellectual processes and upon objective experience, a set of ideals which constitute our methodology and criteria of reality. The examination of the knowing process reveals that it is oriented by the will directed toward certain objectives, goals, values, aims, ideals, which prescribe the further direction of thought. What we find in the World is, in an important sense, what we expect and will to find. Pure "intellectual neutrality" is impossible.

Is there no escape, then, from philosophical prejudice or mere psychological caprice? The author admits that philosophies are generally oriented from such prejudice. But there is one point of departure which involves no such special prejudice, namely, from the standpoint of that value which must have universal acknowledgment, the value of sheer *intelligibility*. The necessary presuppositions of human communication, of mutual intelligibility provide a logical and axiological leverage by means of which the individual can leap clear of the bog of psychological nihilism.

So far, so good. But what specifically are these presuppositions? They are three, namely, that the cosmos erected by thought shall be "penetrable," comprehensible and livable. In ordinary language, the cosmos must be represented in concepts intimately known, it must be logically coherent, and it must inspire those richer and more spiritual satisfactions which constitute the essence of what the ordinary man calls the "meaning of life."

At this point the Modernist will accuse the author of making apparent progress by unlawfully adopting a clever subterfuge in which the blanket term "intelligibility" is used to cover such diversities as intellectual, moral, aesthetic and emotional values. Thus, it will be contended, his whole exposition is a simple although eloquent *ad hominem* argument.

The author will reject the formulation of the objection, but will admit something of the contention. At this point he falls back upon the unity of the human will and the inner demands which the whole mind must acknowledge as requisite for its common search for Reality. All other points of view are based upon the same argument with the added objection that they cut the organic unity of the mind into pieces and arbitrarily elect to retain only one emasculated portion.

With the general contention of Professor Urban the reviewer is heartily in sympathy. He agrees that mere logical or formal coherence is neither the sufficient test of truth nor criterion of Value. The way out is either in the direction of pragmatism or axiologism. The common assumption of both is a wholesome faith in the general integrity of the Cosmos and of man's fundamental ontological demands, whether expressed in social intercourse, religious devotion, aesthetic contemplation of nature, or systematic and formal intellectual enquiry into ontology. Descartes expressed this common assumption in terms of the goodness of God, Hume in terms of instinct, Renouvier as the "postulate of perfection." Man's life is one, and it stands or falls as one. Spiritual pessimism ultimately goes hand in hand with intellectual skepticism.

The effectiveness of the author's statement is naturally reduced by this brief summary. He will probably convince no one who has made up his mind otherwise, but he will renew the enthusiasm of those whose zeal for a spiritual interpretation of Reality may have flagged.

The greater portion of the book, and that for which the author claims originality, is the metaphysical deduction based upon the preliminary statement which has to do with epistemology. Lack of space prohibits

an adequate summary of this portion of the volume. The author is concerned with certain general metaphysical tendencies to which his theory of value and of intelligibility is pledged, rather than with the construction of a complete system. The outcome is an idealistic view in the liberal meaning of the term, in which the "lower" categories which have to do with space and time are subordinated to the "higher." The idiom of intelligible philosophy cannot dispense with the traditional categories of cause and purpose, of substance and essence, of life, of organism. In the light of his thesis the author examines critically the concept of origin, evolution, matter and spirit, finality and destiny, progress and the degradation of physical energy.

In brief, there can be no absolute dualism of first principles. Matter is intelligible as a derivation from Spirit, not the reverse. Evolution is not an ultimate principle of explanation; there is growth *in* the cosmos, not *of* it. Ultimate causal explanation involves teleology, and immanence cannot supplant the doctrine of externality. Progress and the conservation of values are affirmed; the second law of thermodynamics is harmless since the order of space and time is phenomenal. The author's conclusion is everywhere in keeping with his assertion that "the type of speculation that alone has intelligible meaning" is "the *spiritualistic*." His final words give a fitting summary of his position: "In this last sentence is to be found the epitome of all that this book has attempted to say. Philosophy is intelligible discourse about the world, and the metaphysical idiom of the Great Tradition is the only language that is really intelligible." This is a significant piece of philosophic literature.

WILBUR LONG.

Aesthetics

AESTHETIC JUDGMENT, by D. W. PRALL. The Thomas Y. Crowell Company, N. Y. 1929. Pp. 378. \$4.00.

SCIENTIFIC METHODS IN AESTHETICS, by THOMAS MUNRO. W. W. Norton and Company, N. Y. 1928. Pp. 101.

Mr. Prall's *Aesthetic Judgment* is written in so pleasant a style, and the arguments are so cogently set forth, that the book is a joy to read from cover to cover.

To write a work on aesthetics and define unambiguously the aesthetic fact, and to make it at the same time of such general interest that all may read it easily and with pleasure and profit is as well worth doing as it is difficult to do. The subject in Mr. Prall's hands covers a wide field. He deals not only with the strictly aesthetic point of view, he also directs us to the fundamentals of color, sound, shape, rhythm, etc., and to the particular techniques and the particular materials which determine the separate arts. If we are to have a science of aesthetics we must reduce our aesthetic facts to their simplest form and we must recognize and define what we mean by aesthetic value. A judgment of beauty depends on processes involving far more than the properties we designate beautiful, for beauty depends on delicate powers of human discrimination, that is

to say, on aesthetic experience. It is only by developing our discriminative faculties that we respond to the unified group of qualities which signify for us a beautiful object. Discrimination is the very kernel of aesthetic experience. Our contradictory judgments arise from our relatively different powers of discrimination, due either to natural gifts or to trained apprehension, or to the modes which supervene on the thousand ills which flesh is heir to.

Aesthetic is associated with perception, for sense discernment is the condition of aesthetic experience. Artistic things appeal to our senses, that is, they are never without what we call aesthetic value. "Beauty always is just felt. If it strikes you and you are struck by it, the blow is on your feeling capacities through the senses." "It is the object as one unified and unitary apprehended form that has the beauty that you feel." The beauty when felt is not the work of the senses, it is due to the activity we call imagination, generated neither by feeling nor by thought, an activity of aesthetic creation.

There is a delightful chapter dealing with the significance of Native Primitive Art and the naturalness of artistic activities and artistic enjoyments in civilizations on a far simpler level than ours. Native art, whether it is representational or merely spontaneous, is always the creation of definitely rhythmical structures, either representative of objects, or of formal arrangements reproducible by human organs in dance and song, or by crude musical instruments. These forms make up the elements of primitive native art.

In the analytic chapters of the book the whole material of art, that is, the aesthetic sensuous manifold, is surveyed, and a clear distinction is drawn between the beauty of the strictly aesthetic surface, that is the materiality of art, and the beauty of art itself. It is to the surface material of the world, to sounds and sights and smells and tastes, to rhythms and tones, that the artist must go for his material, yet this sensuous field has little to say to the art itself for which it furnishes the material. The artist lives upon the earth's surface, draws his material from nature, but it is not the material drawn out by the bucket load which makes his art. Art consists in submitting the creative impulse which has been aroused by some natural fact to the conditions of an artistic problem.

To summarize a few of the essential points dealing with the fine arts, Mr. Prall maintains that aesthetic pleasure is always present in an object or objects immediately present to sense, whether the beauty enjoyed be that of natural sights and sounds, or objects of art. Artists, however original their intuition, must use familiar natural forms in their artistic expression and these forms are recognizable as natural, no matter how distorted or modified. Art never uses purely abstract forms; if it did, it would be nothing but a cryptic code intelligible only to those possessing the clue. In all works of art there is some specific beauty which has been felt and grasped. The beauty immediately present to sense in natural forms is never present to sense only, the senses are but the avenues of approach to it. The beauty we see is brought about by the activity of our own aesthetic

creation, which is private and particular to each of us. The artist can give images extrinsic form, fixing them in material objects, but the image which is the real work of art must exist first of all in the mind of the artist. The peculiar beauties of a work of art are easily lost upon an unimaginative mind, because the appreciation of a work of art depends largely on its being recreated in another mind, through stored up images, and if these images are lacking the aesthetic appreciation will be lacking also. Every work of art speaks its own language, and it is never entirely convertible into another. To realize the beauty of a painting one must in some sort of way do for oneself the work which the artist who created the picture has done. To some extent painting can be translated into spoken and written language, but not entirely; there is a point where the value is not translatable, and the picture, to be appreciated to the full, must be contemplated and delighted in for what it is in itself, a picture in its own unique beauty.

Mr. Prall has a very interesting theory of the difference between what is artistically beautiful and what is naturally beautiful. The beauty of nature is only accidentally and unintentionally beautiful, whereas the beauty of art is intentionally beautiful. The accidental in nature is only an appearance due to our ignorance, nature has no arbitrariness, it is bound up in necessity and inevitability. Artistic beauty occurs when the artist is successful in composing the materials of the sensuous surface of the world into temporal and spatial structures.

Mr. Prall's account of the relatively different aesthetic characters of the senses is very interesting. Color can be divided up into a structural prismatic scale, and sound can also be divided up into structural but rather more arbitrary scales, but for the surface material of taste and smell we have found no intrinsic natural structure. Hence taste and smell although aesthetic, since both can be delightful to sense, are based on qualities which are non-structural, that is, on qualities which have no scale of relations. Cooks in their own line are often said to be superb artists, and the French jocularly decorate their great culinary artists with the *ordon bleu*, the highest honor in the ancient regime, the order of Knights of the Holy Ghost. But it is because the elements of taste and smell have no discoverable order, because they depend on no structural principles that they must be ruled out of the characteristically aesthetic ranks.

GERALDINE CARR.

Scientific Methods in Aesthetics, by Thomas Munro, is the crudest of all the proposals we have met with for constituting aesthetics into a science. It is something like this—Wanted: to know why the Mona Lisa gives pleasure as a work of art. Method: draw up a questionnaire and distribute it as widely as possible. Tabulate the replies and formulate from them general rules for the production of works of art. H. W. C.

Personalities and Doctrines

BORDEN PARKER BOWNE, by FRANCIS JOHN McCONNELL.
The Abingdon Press, N. Y. 1929. Pp. 291. \$3.00.

DIOGENES LAERTIUS, by RICHARD HOPE. The Columbia University Press, N. Y. 1930. Pp. 241. \$3.50.

THE MEANING OF ROUSSEAU, by ERNEST HUNTER WRIGHT. Oxford University Press, Am. Br., N. Y. 1929. Pp. 168. \$3.00.

No one could have written of the life and philosophy of Bowne with finer discernment or more sympathetic understanding than has Bishop McConnell in *Borden Parker Bowne, His Life and His Philosophy*. McConnell's preparation for the task lay not only in a personal friendship extending over many years, but more than that in a philosophic disposition, a temper of mind and a use of language which was more nearly like Bowne's than that of perhaps any other student that Bowne ever had. For this reason it is a widespread source of satisfaction to a great number of Bowne's former students that the Bishop was given the task of writing the biography.

The book possesses great value in that it presents the inner springs and principles of Bownian thought and throws a flood of light on many things that were more or less obscure to those pupils who, though admiring, followed him from "afar off." And this suggests what may be added to the reasons mentioned in the book for the almost unaccountable confinement of Bowne's influence to denominational circles. There was, of course, the fact that practically all his students of graduate grade were from the School of Theology, but many more of these might have arisen to perpetuate his fame and call attention to his teaching but for fear of his devastating sarcasm. It was fatal to pronounce a misconception in his presence and it was only the stupid who risked the professorial lightning. But the general result of such awe was not encouraging to the development of philosophical confidence. The tyro can learn only by expression and expression is not easy in the presence of so keen a sarcasm. This writer had studied with Bowne for several years before he had the daring to call on him, and that was after he had left school. The result was, of course, gratifying, for he learned to his surprise of that other side, the human, friendly, and whimsical side of the great teacher of which he had been quite unaware.

It is still too early to evaluate and to place Bowne in the history of philosophy, but we believe he will be given an honored place in the development of personalistic ideas and a place of great importance as an influence in American thought. This influence is and has been far greater than is likely ever to be recognized, since it largely spent itself in broadening the intellectual and theological horizons of churchmen and ministers, and it came at a period when most needed. From this standpoint his influence was great and incalculable and we believe this is where he most wished it to be. From some far star, he must look upon the fruitage of his labors, and be satisfied.

We rejoice in the fine bit of work and the labor of love with which his most trusted disciple has favored us. We wish it might have appeared fifteen years sooner, since it would then have been more effective, and we

miss in it the intimate personal details to be gathered from correspondence and interview, which would have displayed more vividly a rich and striking personality. Evidently not much of this material was available to Bishop McConnell, which is a great pity.

R. T. F.

If any one ever believed that in the *Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers* we possess anything like a critical history of Greek philosophy by one who understood what he was writing about, Dr. Hope's book on *Diogenes Laertius* is calculated to undeceive him pretty thoroughly. He piles up masses of evidence to the contrary, in a way that shows intensive study and unwearying diligence, and will be found invaluable by future workers in this field. His own work is largely statistical, and he is extremely cautious in drawing any but negative conclusions, pointing out that a proper critical text of Diogenes is indispensable for further progress. But he is a little inclined to condemn Diogenes utterly because he was not an intelligent and critical philosopher, and fails to tell us many things we should have liked to know. After all he deserves a little gratitude for having preserved for us many details about the Greek philosophers of which we should otherwise have remained in total ignorance.

F. C. S. S.

Rousseau is a glittering example of the fact that misunderstanding is often the price of greatness. Unquestionably he is responsible for a portion of this misunderstanding; it is a pity that meticulous scholarship should so generously aggravate the matter. That such an eighteenth century thinker as John Wesley should have characterized that French genius as a "coxcomb" is forgivable; twentieth century scholarship from its vantage point of larger perspective may naturally be expected to estimate more sympathetically and generously the man whose influence counted so heavily against the chilling intellectualism of eighteenth century deism and materialism. Professor Wright in his interesting and valuable appraisal of the essential thought of the man, *The Meaning of Rousseau*, puts it aptly in observing that

The thought of Rousseau is by no means one of those rare systems all laid out minutely in advance, with every item in precise position and in perfect harmony with all the others. It grew and gathered in his reveries like a flowing river, fed by many tributaries as it struggled to its outlet. And its unity, if such it has, is like that of a swelling stream. If we are looking for such a unity, we must be prepared for ebb and flood, for twists and turns, for cross-currents, eddies, and backwaters, and with possibly a whirlpool here and there; and we may have trouble to make sure that the main current goes in one direction.

The writer, however, contends that a profound study of Rousseau will reveal a well defined general tendency, a consistent set of doctrines worthy of fair appraisal and deeper appreciation:

In this little volume I have tried to put down Rousseau's main opinions as a long perusal of his work has led me to believe he meant

them. It is surely time we knew his own intention. After all our years of controversy over him we have still no document in English, and but few in any language, that will simply tell us what he meant to say; and in consequence a great deal of our controversy has been over things he never meant at all.

It is easy to pick out epigrammatic bits which will make a case for the imbecility of Rousseau; it is easy to see him bad. But, the author insists, the doctrines of the real and authentic Rousseau are worthy of our quest.

The volume before us surveys the central features of this thought, which are found to consist in his doctrine of the natural man, natural education, natural society, and natural religion. As expounded and interpreted Rousseau's thought flowers into a sane and seductive system. Whatever the vagaries of the details, the world has been enriched by this system; in many respects we are his debtors. Concerning his contribution to religion the writer observes that

In the remarkable revival of religion which followed the age of atheism, Rousseau was the main influence in his land for the restoration of Christianity. He had been the single author of genius there to keep a religion. We may wish that it had come from cleaner hands, just as we may wish that the honest doubt of Holbach and Voltaire had come from men as honest. If we cannot choose between their persons, we may take our preference of their doctrines. Professor Wright's sympathetic restoration of the authentic Rousseau is a valuable piece of critical and expository scholarship. W. H. L.

Religion in the Forum

THE PLACE OF JESUS CHRIST IN MODERN CHRISTIANITY, by JOHN BAILLIE. Charles Scribner's Sons, N. Y. 1929. Pp. 219. \$2.00.

DO WE NEED A NEW RELIGION? by PAUL ARTHUR SCHILPP. Henry Holt and Company, N. Y. 1929. Pp. 325. \$2.50. —

CONFLICTS IN RELIGIOUS THOUGHT, by GEORGIA HARKNESS. Henry Holt and Company, N. Y. 1929. Pp. 326. \$2.00.

The Place of Jesus Christ in Modern Christianity, by Professor John Baillie, is based upon a course of lectures given at Union Seminary. The author recognizes that to many men of the present day the Christology which the church has held in the past seems little better than mythology. Nevertheless, it reflects the most important of Christian truths. The author considers the treatment accorded to the historic position by Hegel and Schleiermacher, and by other philosophers and theologians in accord with one or the other of them; traces the thought of suffering love in the New Testament and in the history of the early church, shows how it led to the conception of God as Himself suffering with and for the world, treats of Christ as the founder of Christianity and its continued inspiration, traces the origin of the idea of redemption to Jesus, takes

issue with Loisy and Lake and others who maintain that Jesus had nothing new to teach about God, analyzes the familiar distinction between the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith, finds the eternal mind and will fully revealed in Jesus, reviews certain "unsatisfying interpretations," such as that of the two natures and the two wills in Christ, contrasts the conceptions of incarnation and deification, passes in review certain historic doctrines of atonement, holds that "the advent and the life and death of Jesus were themselves the supreme manifestation of God's redemptive activity toward the human race," and passes in conclusion to some "final clarifications" necessary with regard to the doctrine of the trinity. The volume is full of historical and biblical learning and is conceived in a wholly constructive spirit.

Particular types of religion are being weighed in the balance. Is Christianity sufficient, or do we need a new religion? Man is naturally religious and will have a religion of some kind. The question is as to the kind. The thesis of Professor Paul Arthur Schilpp in *Do We Need a New Religion?* is that there is a kind of Christianity that can meet the needs of the time. "We need," he says, "a greater revival." This revival is to be first of all a revival of the church, which has failed in its valuation of education and of scientific progress, in its indifference to growing class distinctions, in its aloofness from politics and its attitude toward war. The church must be born again. We must have freedom in religion. Its social aspect must be recognized. While religion is primarily a matter of life, religious beliefs are also very important. The primary religious belief is belief in God, which rests first upon religious experience and upon man's need of God, and second, upon intellectual grounds. The best concept of God for religious purposes is that of Jesus. The deification of Jesus robs his life of its greatest value. Christ is our hope only if we are endowed with his spirit. "The incarnation is a constantly recurring event." We need certainty in religion only with reference to its practical application. The newest tendency in science is away from the mechanistic or materialistic view. We do not need a new religion but a better and more vital Christianity.

In the preface to her book, *Conflicts in Religious Thought*, Professor Georgia Harkness defends herself quite justly against the criticism that her work is too elementary, since she has intended it for "the intelligent but philosophically uninitiated layman." The treatment is philosophical rather than theological and approaches universal problems such as faith, truth, God, sin, suffering, prayer, immortality, from the point of view of experience rather than authority. Faith is defined as "a rationally grounded conviction of the truth of beliefs not wholly proved." The author's test of truth is coherence; "Pragmatism, like skepticism, refutes itself." Her dealing with the obstacles to belief in God is frank and persuasive as is her discussion of "teleology versus mechanism," and of "personality human and divine." The book is elementary or introductory as the author says and intends. But it introduces its readers to vital questions which thoughtful people ask about religion. It is equipped with a good index.

CARL S. PATTON.

Miscellaneous

INDIVIDUALITY AND EDUCATION, by JOSEPH A. LEIGHTON. D. Appleton and Company, N. Y. Pp. 204. \$2.00.

Those who have found intellectual soundness and spiritual breadth in the personalistic writings of Professor Leighton will not be disappointed in this little book of essays in which the author's ripe wisdom applies itself to the field of education. The argument, according to the preface, sustains three fundamental theses:

(The first is that) the paramount interest and purpose of education in a democratic society is the nurturing and functioning of socialized individuality, or self-determining personality. Personality is the achiever, center, and enjoyer of all values. To be a person in a community of persons is the all-inclusive and supreme value, or good of living.

The second thesis is that the prime condition of educational improvement is a more dynamic and higher-grade teaching personnel, in the absence of which educational methods and curricula are ineffectual. Thirdly, "education demands a greater investment of both intelligent concern and money than any society has yet made."

The author places the emphasis squarely where it belongs. Personality as creative, intelligent, responsible, self-directing, is the means and end of all good education:

The distinction of most importance in our world is that between *material things*, which have no inner capacity for feeling, choice, self-direction, responsibility; and *persons*, to whom belong all these capacities. The degree of progress of any human society toward the true social ideal is to be measured precisely in terms of the opportunities and incitements it affords for all its members to achieve personality; that is, moral and socialized individuality.

In the attempt of America at mass education we too often deal with personality *as* mass, by mass methods, for mass society. The result, as the writer puts it, is the "educational department store" and the "time-clock basis of credit units," in which there is enthusiasm neither in the faculty nor student-body. Education is personality building, and "the development of character is the development of personality." Education must be guided by an ideal of liberal humanism in which the capacities of the individual, not only in the mechanics of scientific training, but of man's moral and spiritual inheritance, shall be brought to fruition. Education, in the final analysis is self-education, and the school can do little more than to prepare the individual for a life of self-directed study. The author's warning against the essential weakness of democratic education is timely:

Democracy cannot flourish and progress culturally, unless it includes a vigorous mental and moral aristocracy. The worst of all perversions of the ideal of democracy is that which takes equality to imply mental and spiritual equality among all citizens. The most

unlovely and mischievous feature of actual democracy lies in the worship of commonness, vulgarity, mediocrity, indistinction. The cult of indistinction, which results in a leveling down of the cultural life to the low average tastes and powers of the common crowd, is inimical to the cultural progress of man Therefore, as one follows the ascent from the primary grades to the university, the selective processes of education should function with greater efficiency and urgency in the direction of gradations in distinction, in high-mindedness. In the true sense of the term, a university must be an aristocratic institution. Its genuine function is to enable the development to the highest possible point of mental individuality.

The essays comprising this little volume are unpretentious in size and popular in style. They are recommended to those who desire to take stock of our contemporary pedagogical aims and methods, and who believe with the author that "The paramount purpose of education is the realization of the good life."

W. H. L.

FOUNDERS OF THE MIDDLE AGES, by EDWARD KENNARD RAND. Harvard University Press, Mass. 1928. Pp. 365. \$4.00.

Professor Rand in *Founders of the Middle Ages* has added to the real service already rendered to his age in reviving acquaintance with an age too often overlooked but important as the seeding time of many modern movements.

Of special interest and import is his tracing of the development of that humanism which was not only the beginning of scholasticism but of those later currents of thought which ended at last in the renaissance and modern democracy.

Of the exponents of early humanism he rightly names Boethius as one of the most important. He cites Boethius' definition of Personality, "the individual substance of a rational nature," as in many respects still the best that we have. He gives to Boethius the credit for the new method in theology, that is the application of Aristotelian logic to Christian problems, besides of course giving the chief body of Aristotelian material to the first half of the Middle Ages.

His relation to Personalism is definitely recognized:

Thus the idea of Good identified with God, though the converse proposition, that God is nothing more than the idea of Goodness, does not follow; for the underlying conception of the divine nature is not idealism but personal theism—a step that neither Aristotle nor Plato (except for pictorial purposes in the mythological *Timaeus*) could quite take. But this God, though omnipotent, is incapable of one thing, evil, which is thereby pronounced non-existent. Dropping this utterance as a seed of further inquiry, Philosophy closes the book with a song on the "lucid source of good," illustrating her theme by a somewhat perverted application of the

story of Orpheus and Eurydice that no lover, Browning, for instance, would approve.

The treatment has been most impressive in these last chapters; the argument moves with a majestic sweep to the conclusion, which like that of the first book, may fairly be called dramatic. In this entire passage, Plato is much more prominent than Aristotle. He is quoted several times, and the poetic prayer is a kind of summary of the *Timaeus*. But Boethius goes beyond both Plato and Aristotle, as I have pointed out, in his acceptance of a personal theism. He invokes the authority of Plato for the need of asking divine aid before undertaking a great metaphysical quest, but while Plato calls on *Theous te Kai Theas*, Boethius prays to the very Being that he is attempting to prove, assuming, it would seem, that faith in deity must precede the endeavor to demonstrate its existence—*credo ut intelligam*. This proof, therefore, to quote again from the treatise on the Trinity, the philosopher does not discover, but corroborates something that "stands by itself on the firm foundation of Faith."

And so from the chapter on The Church and Pagan Culture through those on St. Ambrose the Mystic and St. Jerome the Humanist to St. Augustine and Dante we have in fine literary style and sparkling humor the story of the rising foundations of modern culture, with many suggestions of wisdom for our own times, as when the author calls attention to the fact that the modern smut-bearing, hero-destroying biography is in a truer sense the autobiography of the author himself.

One grave defect, at least to us, is to be compelled to get the fine points of many of the witticisms of the book, as for instance, the reference to the eminent historian of the beginnings of Christianity who declared that "the departure from orthodoxy is always in the direction of truth." Of course one would suspect Kirsopp Lake at once, but one hates in order to get the point of so delicate a turn to stop and look up note 40 of chapter four arranged in most distractingly cumbersome order at the end of the volume.

R. T. F.

INSTINCT AND INTELLIGENCE, by MAJOR W. G. HINGSTON.
The Macmillan Company, N. Y. 1929. Pp. 296. \$2.50.

This interesting volume about insect behavior sustains the thesis that the psychological difference between these creatures and man, at the apex of the two diverging streams of psychological evolution, is one of degrees and not of kind.

I do not subscribe to that opinion which holds that they (the insects) are highly rational creatures, writes the author, and that all this show of elaborate behavior is the outcome of a high intelligence. I have said that these activities are mainly instinctive, but that running through them is a stream of judgment . . . Every animal, man included, possesses two sets of mental activity: the one instinctive, automatic, innate: the other intelligent, plastic and ac-

quired. These two activities are always blended. They may differ immensely in degrees of development, but they never completely separate from each other.

The insect mind and the human mind differ mainly in the development of these two factors. Instinct predominates in the insect mind: intelligence in the mind of man. Nevertheless in both the insect and man these two factors definitely exist.

The volume consists of two general topics, both dealing with insect life. The earlier chapters discuss instinct in this group—its perfection, inflexibility, rhythm, wisdom, folly, limitation and variability. The latter portion of the book deals with intelligence, particularly among the ants and wasps. The author presents hundreds of interesting cases to illustrate his theory. Undoubtedly the facts are absorbing, and the writer is correct in stating that "We cannot explain psychic phenomena by reducing things to physical and chemical laws. Even insect psychology has something else." What he has not proved, although the facts are extraordinary, is that insect and human minds are essentially one in kind. Major Hingston does not seem to be aware of recent developments in non-mechanistic psychological theory. His position is essentially Spencerian in his theory of evolution, and his desire to prove the continuity of mental as well as physical life. His theory of instinct is that elaborated by Butler, that racial habits become innate through the inheritance of acquired useful mental characteristics.

The reader of this book will undoubtedly agree with Bertrand Russell, who writes the introduction (and, incidentally, questions the main inferences of the author), that "The book is fascinating reading."

W. H. L.

JULIAN THE APOSTATE, now translated for the first time from the Syriac original, by SIR HERMANN GOLLANCZ. Oxford University Press, Am. Br., N. Y. 1928. Pp. 264.

As a curious ancient tract for the edification of the faithful, the translation by Sir Hermann Gollancz of *Julian the Apostate* opens a door of understanding into the period of the Christian church from the sixth to the eleventh centuries. The vision is not reassuring for it shows ignorance and superstition to the limit. It is strange what appeals can be made in the name of religion, by those who consider themselves "defenders of the faith!" But here it is woven about the name of that ancient enemy of the church whose hostility awakened Christianity from the degradation to which it had fallen under the patronage of the Emperors Constantine and Constantius. This tract which was considered good evangelism once has now for the first time been translated from J. G. Ernst Hoffman's edition of the Syriac text. So valuable is any addition to the literature of the period that even this report of legend, miracle and falsehood in the interest of pure religion forms a desirable addition for purposes of scholarly research and it is a contribution to have it available to the average student in an English translation.

R. T. F.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCHOPENHAUER, edited by PROFESSOR IRWIN EDMAN. The Modern Library Series, N. Y. 1928. Pp. 376. \$.95.

It is of interest especially to teachers and to others who desire the philosophical classics in an inexpensive, compact, and attractive form that we now have have *The Philosophy of Schopenhauer* edited by Edman in *The Modern Library Series*. The printing is unusually well done, the type clear and distinct. The volume includes, *The World as Will*, *The World as Idea*, and *The Metaphysics of the Love of the Sexes*.

R. T. F.

THE FUNCTION OF REASON, by ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD. Princeton University Press, N. J. 1929. Pp. 72. \$1.50.

The Function of Reason is one of Professor Whitehead's very delightful lay sermons, pregnant with wisdom and charming in expression. Its theme is the subject which appears more than any other to have fastened itself on the present generation of scientific workers, the opposition of entropy and evolution. The physicist sees matter in energy systems which from a present high potential are running down and he has no indication of how the process can be reversed. The biologist sees life evolving ever higher forms of activity and he knows not how it can have begun. The philosopher would like to see in the two directions a single principle, but if there be such a principle nature seems to have successfully concealed it from us.

H. W. C.

A HISTORY OF GREECE, by CYRIL E. ROBINSON. Thomas Y. Crowell, N. Y. 1929. Pp. 480. \$3.50.

This volume of Greek history will be welcome more for the beauty of its style and workmanship perhaps than for any originality of its contribution, although it is based upon the results of the most recent critical scholarship. Its chief merit, however, is its fulfilment of the important task of making history interesting. The student of philosophy, or religion, or science, or social progress, will find here a work in the general outlines of Greek history by an author who has a broad interest in philosophy and art as well as social and political events. The work therefore transcends the narrow range of politico-military events, and by a judicious choice of the vast materials, gives the student a grasp of the many sided development of the Greek Genius. Professor Robinson is at his best in his interpretive writing, especially the chapter on "The City State and Its Legacy" and a final chapter on "The Hellenistic Age and After." The scope of the work is from the archeological remains of the Minoan ages to the death of Alexander and the cultural influences on the Roman world. Thirty-five pages are devoted to very useful chronological tables and summaries. The interest of the book is enhanced by numerous maps and photographic plates of Greek art and landscapes.

A. R. K.

CHINA: YESTERDAY AND TODAY, by PROFESSOR EDWARD THOMAS WILLIAMS. Thomas Y. Crowell and Company, N. Y. 1929. Pp. 743. \$3.75.

In days of increasing interest in the Orient, it is well to have a revised and up-to-date edition of Edward Thomas Williams' *China*. Where else could be found so much of valuable information regarding China and in so compact a form? Where else could be found an author with such opportunities for knowledge? Since 1887 he has been identified with Chinese life, first as a missionary, then as Vice Consul General, at Shanghai, Secretariat at the American Legation in Peking, Consul General at Tientsin, Charge d'Affaires at Peking, and twice serving in the Far Eastern Division of the Department of State at Washington. In 1918 he accepted the chair of Oriental Philosophy and Literature at the University of California at Berkeley. The new edition will be desired not only by all who are interested in China and her affairs but especially by any who contemplate travel there.

R. T. F.

LIBERTY IN THE MODERN WORLD, by GEORGE BRYAN LOGAN, JR. The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill. Pp. 142. \$2.00.

One of the charms of this neatly edited book is its pervading spirit of sincerity and genuine interest in the problem.

The subject is introduced by the analysis of the meaning of liberty. In the author's words, liberty consists

in the fullest and freest adaptation of man's character, faculties, and habits to the world of nature, the world of his fellows, and the central world of consciousness, and his resulting use of them all, in so far as he is able to use them, for his own good.

The rest of the work is devoted to a discussion of the problem in the various fields of life: law, government, thought and expression, labor, science, and religion. The book may be regarded as a historical introduction to the problem of liberty. But, although the historical feeling of the author is acute, the contents serve the purpose of illustrating something more important, namely, the fact that liberty is a value, the closest to the human heart. It is one of the great achievements of Christianity that it has succeeded in uniting the Hellenic concept of justice and the Hebraic notion of righteousness. Liberty is the great modern attainment, easily lost, and which it is our duty to preserve and defend.

R. B. WINN.

THE THEORIES OF INSTINCT, A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY, by E. C. WILM. Yale University Press, Conn. 1925. Pp. 188. \$2.50.

Inspired by the recognition that "the class of acts traditionally called instinctive affords a capital opportunity for the study of the general question whether nature as a whole is capable of a mechanistic interpretation," the author proposes a "fairly complete treatment of the subject

of instinct both on the historical and the theoretical side." The present volume comprises the first of two, the second of which, it is promised, will subsequently appear, and will contain both a historical survey of post-Darwinian theories of instinct and the constructive interpretations of the writer. The present volume deals entirely with the historical survey of theories from Thales to Darwin. The period prior to the eighteenth century is necessarily sketchy since, as the author indicates, "only the slightest beginnings of a scientific theory of instinct can be discovered previous to the rise of modern evolutionary biology," a fact which is worthy of note as of importance in understanding the concept of instinct itself. The present study is a contribution to scholarship in bringing together historical materials and clarifying a topic which, because of its manifold philosophical ramifications, has frequently suffered from want of adequate analysis and critical evaluation.

W. H. L.

HOW WE INHERIT, by EDGAR ALTENBURG. Henry Holt and Company, N. Y. 1928. Pp. 273. \$2.40.

This is a readable introduction to the science of heredity, presupposing no previous acquaintance with biology on the part of the reader. Numerous charts and diagrams assist in elucidating the subject matter of the text. The author seems to overstep the bounds of philosophical propriety, however, when in his discussion of Mutation he insists that "It is haphazard and blind in its mode of occurrence, but it is the very process through which the wonderful array of life-forms of the past and present has come into existence." There is no logical reason why biologists should seek even at the risk of nonsense to avoid giving orthogenesis a fair deal in the debate concerning evolution. The discussion of Inbreeding has some ethical and social implications worthy of attention. The writer insists that inbreeding is of value where the biological stock is good and contains no defective genes:

"In the case of the Darwin family, with its exceptionally good genes, the marriage of first cousins was very desirable."

It is true that where the family line contains defective genes, causes of mental inferiority, inbreeding produces more defectives. Even here, however, with the modern practice of segregation and sterilization this is not necessarily a loss, since it brings feeble-mindedness to the surface where it may be exterminated; whereas by outbreeding feeble-mindedness, which is a recessive trait, is merely submerged but never lost. The conclusion is that "To encourage outbreeding further by laws against the marriage of first cousins would at least seem unnecessary."

W. H. L.

BOOKS RECEIVED

- CATHOLICISM AND CHRISTIANITY, by CECIL JOHN CADOUX. The Dial Press, N. Y. 1929. Pp. 708. \$6.00.
- THE THINKING MACHINE, by C. JUDSON HERRICK. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 1929. Pp. 374. \$3.00.
- THE BHAGAVAD GITA, translated from the Sanskrit by ARTHUR W. RYDER. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 1929. Pp. 139. \$2.00.
- LE CARDINAL LOUIS DE LAPALUD ET SON PROCES POUR LA POSSESSION DU SIEGE EPISCOPAL DE LAUSANNE, par JULES SCHWEIZER. Librairie Felix Alcan, Paris. 1929. Pp. 200.
- CREATIVE UNDERSTANDING, by COUNT HERMANN KEYSERLING. Harper and Brothers, N. Y. 1929. Pp. 500. \$5.00.
- SICK SOCIETY, by A. J. I. KRAUS. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 1929. Pp. 206. \$2.00.
- THE INFLUENCE OF CHRIST IN THE ANCIENT WORLD, by T. R. GLOVER. Yale University Press, Conn. 1929. Pp. 121. \$1.50.
- NATURE—COSMIC, HUMAN AND DIVINE, by JAMES YOUNG SIMPSON. Yale University Press, Conn. 1929. Pp. 157. \$2.00.
- KANT SELECTIONS, edited by THEODORE M. GREENE. Charles Scribner's Sons, N. Y. 1929. Pp. 526. \$1.00.
- SELECTIONS FROM MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHERS, edited by RICHARD MCKEON. Charles Scribner's Sons, N. Y. 1929. Pp. 375. \$1.00.
- CRESCA'S CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTLE, by HARRY AUSTRYN WOLFSON. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1929. Pp. 759.
- LOGIC FOR USE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE VOLUNTARIST THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE, by FERDINAND CANNING SCOTT SCHILLER. Harcourt, Brace and Company, N. Y. 1930. Pp. 469. \$4.75.
- THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART, by C. J. DUCASSE. The Dial Press, N. Y. 1929. Pp. 313. \$3.50.
- A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF JOHN DEWEY, by MILTON HALSEY THOMAS AND HERBERT WALLACE SCHNEIDER. Columbia University Press, N. Y. 1929. Pp. 151. \$3.00.
- PASCAL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION, by CLEMENT C. J. WEBB. Oxford University Press, Am. Br., N. Y. 1929. Pp. 118.
- LATIN THOUGHT DURING THE MIDDLE AGES, by CESARE FOLIGNO. Oxford University Press, Am. Br., N. Y. Pp. 120.

The PERSONALIST

FOR OCTOBER
AND LATER ISSUES

CREATION, EMERGENCE, NOVELTY

F. C. S. SCHILLER

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THE EDITOR

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J. E. TURNER

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RUTH ALMA ECKHART

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BY

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Our Contributors' Page

Modern idealism clashes sharply with modern realism in **Professor H. Wildon Carr's** critique of *Professor Whitehead's World-Building*. The occasion of the essay is the recent publication of Professor Whitehead's *Process and Reality*.

Readers of **THE PERSONALIST** have a right to expect **John Richard Moreland's** verses from time to time. His *Evening* will not disappoint them.

Widespread attempts at a diagnosis of contemporary cultural tendencies in the United States indicate that the present scene is charged with both interest and uncertainty. The discussion *On "Making Culture Hum"* by **Moira Parke Peery** would seem to bear out both notions. Mrs. Peery is past president of the Drama League of America in Los Angeles and is active in club and literary work.

The century-old literary realism of Jane Austen has proved fascinating to modern critics. In *Jane Austen to the Modern Realists* **THE PERSONALIST** offers the winner of an essay prize given by the Norfolk, Virginia, Society of Arts. **Julia Johnson Davis** is known to readers of this magazine for her verses.

Valmai Burdwood Evans is M.A. of the University of Wales and B.Litt. of Oxford. She has also studied philosophy under Professor Gentile at the University of Rome, and is specially qualified to expound the New Idealism which he represents. The only work of Gentile at present available in English is the *Theory of Mind as Pure Act*, translated by H. Wildon Carr. Miss Evans is herself engaged in translating the *Logic*.

Another member of the Norfolk literary colony, **Josephine Johnson**, contributes the verse, *Reflections*.

Clara Frances McIntyre, Professor of English in the University of Wyoming, returns to **THE PERSONALIST** in her discussion of *Man the Romantic*. Professor McIntyre possesses the Ph.D. degree from Yale University and is the author of many essays and short stories.

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To the Gentle Personalist

¶ Doctor Long's ship went hull down on our horizon a few days since, bound for Japan, China and the Orient. Our Personalist readers will miss his virile writing during the coming year. In the trying days of the past year he has been a tower of strength to the Editor and it is only fair that there should be here public expression of our gratitude and appreciation for help so efficiently given under such difficult circumstances. May the coming fifteen months bring him broadening knowledge, rest for mind and body, and a strengthening of ties between East and West.

¶ Schiller and Carr are likewise on the broad seas feeling the homeward call of England's hedgerows and associations. They will attend the Oxford Congress and bring Hoernle with them on the return to America. Hoernle comes from South Africa to swell the membership of our faculty for a visiting half-year. With so much sea-going, philosophy might be expected to take on a nautical aspect.

¶ Some of us must stay home, of course, to abide by the staff and welcome the newcomers Starbuck from Iowa State and Searles from James Milliken University, and Lyon from far off China.

¶ These changes must be reflected in the contents of The Personalist during the coming year and do, we hope, portend a broadening of policy and more interesting and vital discussions in its pages. Whatever may be said justly against the Editor, there can be no criticism of the helpers.

¶ With the enthusiastic support of our subscribers we can make this the banner year of The Personalist's history.

havoc he makes of long recognized meanings and the topsy-turveydom he brings about in the use of familiar words. Let me give an illustration of each of these grounds of perplexity.

The ultimate constituents of the world are a class of entities he names "eternal objects." These we are told early in the book are the Platonic ideas but renamed because of an ambiguity in the meaning and employment of the word "idea." Soon however we find sense-data or *sensa* also called "eternal objects." Possibly Professor Whitehead thinks that in this way he can avoid the great difficulty in the Platonic theory, namely, how to relate the ideas to sense experience. But if this is Professor Whitehead's solution it is not Plato's. If it had been Plato's he would surely have put it into Socrates's account of the theory in the *Parmenides* and not have left him silent before the dilemma with which Zeno confronted him. This, then, is my first cause of perplexity. To identify the Platonic ideas with the entities which modern realist philosophers name sense-data confuses for me the whole problem of the ancient philosophy from Plato to Plotinus.

My second cause of perplexity is Professor Whitehead's use of the term "feeling." This disconcerts me completely. By feeling I am accustomed to mean pleasure—pain, in so far as this contrast is not resolvable into distinct sensations but qualifies sense experience of every kind. Professor Whitehead uses the word apparently for what Hume called "impressions" and he then goes on to classify feelings by qualities such as "physical", "perceptual", "conceptual", "propositional" and many more, all of which to me sound like flat self-contradictions. I do not deny his right to use words in any way he chooses, but I wish for myself he would rely less on etymology and more on context to fix his meanings. Hegel declared German to be a particularly good language for philosophy because so many of its words admitted a variety of meanings. I agree with Hegel. The wonderful thing to me about discourse is that it conveys meaning by contextual continuity and not by assembling arbitrary signs. "Spoken language is merely a series of squeaks"

says Professor Whitehead (p. 403). I on the contrary cannot believe that even a god by a miracle could turn squeaks into language. I have said enough on this important if minor question of expression, let me come to the philosophy itself.

There have been in the modern period two great system makers, two great philosophers who may be described as world-builders. The first is Descartes; his world-building followed the great Copernican discovery. The second is Hegel; his world-building followed the great philosophical revolution of Kant. Today again there is need of world-building, called for this time by the scientific revolution brought about by the Einstein theory. This is the world-building Professor Whitehead attempts.

"Give me matter and movement and I will make a world" said Descartes. Hegel asked for no outside material. We had, he said in effect, only to look within, follow the activity of the logos or reason as we experience it each in our own spiritual life, to see the evolution of the real—Logic, Nature, and Mind. For Professor Whitehead it is not so simple. His formal requirements are: eight categories of existence; twenty-seven categories of explanation; and nine categoreal obligations. Also he refers to six multiplicities or collective kinds of entities (p. 44) as having been "just mentioned." I cannot find the mention of them. It may be an omission, or it may be a case of looking for the spectacles on my nose, but I have searched and not found them. Besides these formal requirements his material requirements are simpler but quantitatively very formidable—eternal objects without limit, actual occasions without restriction. Thus equipped he invites us to behold the concrescence of the ultimate constituents of nature first into cells and organic wholes and then into ever higher forms. Whence, we ask, is the motive force? The answer is not that of the post-Kantian idealists, that life is consciousness in right, that mind or spirit is the ultimate reality, and that matter is phenomenon. The answer is that of the pre-Kantians. The source is God. The eternal objects are, Professor Whitehead tells us, the pri-